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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS AND THE
LEGACY OF HADLEY
ARTHUR G. MURPHEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1988, an unusual treaty came into effect in the
United States-the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (C.I.S.G.).' The C.I.S.G. is unu-
sual because it means that some, although not all, contracts for
the international sale of goods entered into by U.S. buyers and
sellers will be governed by conventional international law under
one treaty.
2
The C.I.S.G. will present numerous problems in interpreta-
tion. United States judges deciding a case governed by the
C.I.S.G. will have to deal with the "bare bones"-the interpreta-
tion of articles of the C.I.S.G. without the benefit of prior U.S.
cases to guide them. Thus, U.S. judges must be aware of how
their decisions will meet the C.I.S.G.'s goal of "harmonization."
That is, under the C.I.S.G., cases with similar fact patterns should
yield similar results, even when the cases are decided by the
courts of different countries. 3 Yet, unlike the U.S. common law
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. LL.M.
1962, Yale;J.D. 1953, University of Mississippi; A.B. 1951, University of North Carolina.
I thank Professors Peter Linzer, John A. Spanogle, Jr., and Bradford Stone for their
comments and suggestions on the draft of this paper.
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668, 671 (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988), reprinted in
Public Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-80 (1987) [hereinafter C.I.S.G.]. There are six official
language versions of the C.I.S.G.: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Span-
ish. See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980). As of December 22, 1989, the parties to the C.I.S.G.
were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Byelorussian SSR, Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy,
Lesotho, Mexico, Norway, People's Republic of China, Sweden, Syria, United States,
Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Current information on parties to the Convention may be
obtained from the United Nations Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs (tel.:
(212) 754-7958/5048).
2. For a discussion of those governed and not governed, see infra notes 14-18 and
accompanying text.
3. C.I.S.G., supra note 1 art. 7. The C.I.S.G. provides "[i]n the interpretation of
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system, civil law countries do not use cases as precedent. A U.S.
judge may need to speculate about what technique of interpreta-
tion a foreign judge will adopt. This article discusses some of the
matters that might be considered in interpreting the C.I.S.G. arti-
cles. The focus is on a single article of the C.I.S.G. which may
present special problems in interpretation-the article which
governs the recovery of consequential damages.
Many prudent international buyers and sellers will have con-
tracts containing a provision on liability for consequential dam-
ages. This article examines those cases in which a contract is
silent on the issue of consequential damages. Such cases will
require a court to determine whether, and to what extent, conse-
quential damages are to be awarded.
The court's determination will differ greatly from the task of
measuring damages by some mathematical formula, as when the
court determines the damages should be based on the difference
between the market price and the contract price. Since there is
no mathematical rule for assessing consequential damages,
judges must navigate across a poorly-charted plain. The calcula-
tion of consequential damages requires interpreting such terms
as "foreseeable" and "possible"- words that may reflect the val-
ues of the judge.4
In calculating the measure of consequential damages, a judge
looking to the C.I.S.G. may ask several questions. First, to what
extent should the words used in the C.I.S.G. be compared with
those used in other U.S. laws or rules concerning consequential
damages? Second, what principles are served by the use of those
words in U.S. case law? Third, what is the significance of the
words in the C.I.S.G. for peoples of other nations who also will
be bound by its terms? Fourth, what principles do those nations
seek in their rules on consequential damages?
This article examines the landmark British case concerning the
recovery of consequential damages-Hadley v. Baxendale5 -
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade." Id.
4. "Courts and arbitral tribunals will find it difficult to restrain parties of different
legal systems from submitting interpretations of the Convention's provisions highly
influenced by those systems. It can further be questioned whether courts that belong to
those different legal systems are not in any event predisposed to adopt such substantially
diverse interpretations." Thieffry, Sale of Goods Between French and U.S. Merchants: Choice
of Law Considerations Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
22 INT'L LAW. 1017, 1021 (1988).
5. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). The case has been one of
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because the author believes that the decision will exert some
influence on judges' interpretation on the recovery of conse-
quential damages 6 under the C.I.S.G. This article examines
some present trends in recovery, 7 followed by comments on the
desirability of extending protection to the victim of a breach of
contract. The article then examines Hadley, its principles, and its
"rule." The article also explores the critical phrases of Article 74
of the C.I.S.G., which is concerned with consequential damages.
Finally, some ideas from the legal systems of other countries are
applied to the interpretation problems posed by Article 74.
Because some U.S. international sales cases not governed by the
C.I.S.G. will instead be governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), this article examines relevant sections of that code.
Since the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement) is
influential, this article considers relevant Restatement sections as
well.
Hadley is especially important because of three recent events.
Two events concern alterations of the rule of the case that had
been considered by many as discarded long ago: one concerning
the time that the breaching party should foresee the loss and the
other concerning the infamous tacit agreement rule. The third
event represents divergence between the United States and Brit-
ish versions of the rule. Because of these events, U.S. judges
should try to divorce themselves from the influence of Hadley as
much as possible; its rules are not the same as those under the
consequential damages article of the C.I.S.G.
the more important cases for students in American law schools. R. DANZIG, THE CAPA-
BILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 76 (1978) (noting the "exceptional pedagogical cen-
trality" of Hadley); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 443 (3d ed.
1988). Immortality-or at least a promising future-has been ascribed to it. "Hadley v.
Baxendale is still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in the jurisprudential firma-
ment." G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974). But Gilmore had earlier
described it, in his own inimitable style, as "an essentially uninteresting case, decided in
a not very good opinion by a judge otherwise unknown to fame." Id. at 49. All but a
very few judges in state and federal courts in the United States probably were exposed
to the case when they were law students. Many may even remember the case by name,
along with the proposition for which it is said to stand.
6. It should be noted that the term consequential damages has sometimes been
used to refer to damages that cannot be recovered. Bulow, Consequential Damages and the
Duty to Mitigate in New York Maritime Arbitrations, 1984 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 622,
624. "The phrase 'consequential damages' has, unfortunately, been given a somewhat
narrow and pejorative meaning in maritime arbitrations. Maritime arbitrators use it to
mean that the damages claimed are too remote and not recoverable." Id. That meaning
is not adopted here.
7. This is to acknowledge that others may have different data or even interpret the
data given here differently. The material here reflects the author's conclusions.
1989]
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE C.I.S.G. AND ARTICLE 74
The C.I.S.G. is just one step in a movement toward the inter-
national unification of private law.8 Work on a uniform law for
the international sale of goods began fifty years ago by the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT).9 UNIDROIT drafted two treaties known as the
1964 Hague Conventions: the Convention Relating to a Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (ULF),1o and the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law
on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)." The United States
was never a party to either the ULF or the ULIS. In 1968, the
United Nations established the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which began preparing
rules for the sale of goods. Representatives of this group, which
included U.S. Delegates, drew up the C.I.S.G., combining rules
both for the formation of contracts' 2 and for the sale of goods. i 3
The general rule set out in Article 1 of the C.I.S.G., as adopted
by the United States, is that the C.I.S.G. applies to contracts
between parties in which one's place of business is in the United
8. The latest step is the Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Inter-
national Promissory Notes, G.A. Res. 43/165, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 170 (1989). It will be
open for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations until June 30, 1990.
Among those involved in the work on this treaty is Professor John A. Spanogle, Jr., of
the George Washington University National Law Center.
Another such treaty is the 1980 Convention on The Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. S. Doc. No. 99-11, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494-516 (1986)
(including official English language version of the Convention text). For a report on
work in this area, see Pfund, International Unification of Private Law: A Report on U.S. Partici-
pation-1987-88, 22 INT'L LAW. 1157 (1988).
9. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION § 5, at 49 (1982). UNIDROIT suspended its work during World
War II and resumed its drafting in the 1950's. Id.
10. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169.
11. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July
1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107.
12. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, pt. II, arts. 14-24.
13. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, pt. III, arts. 25-88. One of the U.S. representatives, Pro-
fessor John Honnold, authored a major work on the C.I.S.G., J. HONNOLD, supra note 9,
and has recently completed another book on the history and background of the C.I.S.G.
J. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES:
THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS (1989). Professor Allan Farns-
worth, another U.S. representative, has written an article addressing damages under the
C.I.S.G. Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief 27 AM. J. ComP. L. 247 (1979). Those
wishing to read further about the C.I.S.G. will find sources in a recent and extensive
bibliography. Winship, A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations International
Sales Convention, 21 INT'L LAW. 585 (1987).
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States and the other's place of business is in another country
which has ratified the C.I.S.G. 14 Yet, except to the extent that
adoption is forbidden by some mandatory rule of a relevant juris-
diction (such as where the law of a party's place of business gov-
erns the case), parties not otherwise bound by the C.I.S.G. may
adopt certain articles, including the article on consequential
damages, as the governing law. The parties could, in essence,
incorporate by reference articles of the C.I.S.G. without writing
them into the contract. A court also could apply the C.I.S.G. in a
dispute between a U.S. citizen and a party from a country which
did not ratify the C.I.S.G. This scenario might arise if the case
were tried in a third country which had adopted a version of Arti-
cle 1 different from that adopted by the United States.' 5
The C.I.S.G. would not apply if parties otherwise bound agree
not to be bound by the C.I.S.G. Since the C.I.S.G. now prevails
over state laws such as the UCC under the supremacy clause of
the U.S. Constitution,1 6 the parties should carefully draft clauses
to opt out of coverage for specified transactions.' 7 In addition, if
14. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 1. Article 1 provides:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a Contracting State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is
to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract
or from any dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character
of the parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determin-
ing the application of this Convention.
Id. Article 95 provides that "[a]ny State may declare at the time of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by
subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention." Id. art. 95.
The United States chose not to be bound by article l(1)(b). Therefore, U.S. courts
will not apply the C.I.S.G. to suits between parties if one has its place of business in a
country not a party to the treaty.
15. More specifically, if that country adopted subsection (1)(b), the rules of private
international law of that country could lead to the application of the law of the Treaty.
For further discussion on this point, see Thieffry, supra note 4, at 1018-19.
Note also that the United States' reservation excluding (1)(b) could affect an attempt
to opt into the whole Convention. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON, AND J. SPANOGLE, INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 70-71 (3d ed. 1988). This author lim-
its his conclusions to attempts to incorporate certain performance terms only.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
17. Article 6 provides that "[t]he parties may exclude the application of this Con-
vention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provi-
sions." C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 6.
Article 12, referenced in Article 6, addresses the effect of several provisions of the
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the dispute goes into arbitration, an arbitration panel might
decide not to apply the C.I.S.G. 18 Parties to sale of goods con-
tracts which are not governed by the C.I.S.G.-those whose con-
tract does not qualify under Article 1 or parties who agree not to
be bound by the C.I.S.G.-may find themselves instead bound by
contract and sales laws of the United States, usually the UCC, if
not the laws of some other country.
The pertinent C.I.S.G. article, Article 74, provides:
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a
sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the
other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages
may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or
ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, in light of the facts and matters of which he then
knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of
the breach of contract.
Article 74 comes into play following a breach by either the
seller t9 or the buyer20 and is "a general rule for the calculation of
damages for every loss suffered as a consequence of a breach of
contract." 2 1 Article 74 may also be invoked under the two arti-
cles which follow it regarding particular cases in which the con-
tract has been avoided. Article 75 applies when the buyer, after
Convention which allow contracts to be made in a form other than in writing. Several
countries object to those provisions, and Article 12 allows a country to declare the provi-
sions inapplicable in their jurisdictions. Id. art. 12. The effect of these articles is that if a
nation forbids oral contracts, the parties cannot agree that an oral contract will bind
them.
For caution on "opting out" of the Convention, see R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON, AND J.
SPANOGLE, supra note 15, at 70 (warning against a simple statement that the contract
"shall be governed by New York law," since a court could hold that the treaty is New
York International Sales Law).
18. Thieffry, supra note 4, at 1019. "Yet, it should be remembered that the arbitra-
tors have some discretion to determine the rules of law that they will use. The mere fact
that a sale of goods occurred between two entities situated in France and in the United
States, therefore, will not automatically lead the arbitrators, unlike the Contracting
States' courts, to apply the Convention." Id.
19. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 45(1) (stating that "[i]f the seller fails to perform
any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may . . . claim
damages as provided in articles 74 to 77"). For a discussion of Article 77, see infra note
236 and accompanying text.
20. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 61 (stating that "[i]f the buyer fails to perform any
of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the seller may ... claim dam-
ages as provided in articles 74 to 77").
21. Knapp, Damages in General, in C. BIANCA AND M. BONNELL, COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 538, 539 (1987). For a
general discussion of Article 74, see id. at 538-48; see also J. HONNOLD, supra note 9,
§ 403, at 408 (stating that "to state basic principles to govern compensation for breach
of contract . . . is the role of the present article").
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the seller's breach, has bought goods in replacement of those
that were the subject of the contract, or when the seller, after the
buyer's breach, has sold the contract goods.22 Article 75 is thus
similar to the UCC rules on contract-cover 23 and contract-
resale.24 Article 76 measures damages by the current price25 and
is similar to the UCC contract-market rules. 26 Both Articles 75
and 76 allow for the recovery of consequential damages under
Article 74. In addition, Article 74 applies when the contract has
not been avoided, and thus will apply to cases of accepted but
non-conforming goods, breach of warranty, and accepted goods
not properly delivered, such as goods delivered late.
III. SOME THOUGHTS ON INTERPRETATION
Because the C.I.S.G. has become U.S. law, a judge must inter-
pret the C.I.S.G. consistent with both U.S. law and "harmonized"
international law. A judge might look to the plain meaning or
the legislative history of the C.I.S.G., or consider the goal of U.S.
contract law as reflected in contract damages law, particularly as
reflected in the law of consequential damages. The goal of con-
tract law is to protect the expectations of the parties; but the goal
22. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 75. Article 75 provides:
If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reason-
able time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the
seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the differ-
ence between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as
well as any further damages recoverable under article 74.
Id.
23. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1987) (stating that "[a]fter a breach . . . the buyer may
cover' by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase
of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller").
24. See id. § 2-706 ("Under the conditions stated [previously] .... the seller may
resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof.").
25. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 76. Article 76 provides:
(1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the
party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under
Article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and
the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recov-
erable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided
the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such
taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of
avoidance.
(2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price
prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or,
if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves
as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of
transporting the goods.
Id.
26. See U.C.C. §§ 2-708, 2-713 (1987).
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is not easy to attain when the parties realize, only after a breach,
that each had different expectations.
There is no better illustration of this problem than in cases
seeking consequential damages, in which each party foresaw
something different. Hadley v. Baxendale, the opinion which laid
the foundation for consequential damages, highlights this scena-
rio. 27 One party foresaw that late delivery of a parcel would
cause a loss of profits; the other foresaw only a loss of the rental
value of the goods in the parcel for the period of the delay. 28
IV. SOME COMMENTS ON OBSERVED TRENDS
Recent cases indicate that the courts now exhibit more concern
for a party injured by a breach of contract than was the case in
the nineteenth century. This trend is not easy to document
because such a generalization has to be based on one's percep-
tion of how a court has viewed the facts of individual cases.
Among the many cases in which the recovery of consequential
damages is sought, the various fact patterns are sufficiently differ-
ent to render conclusions about their results reckless.2 9
Still, there are several indications that the courts are better
protecting the injured party. First, there has been a change in
the wording of the Hadley rule. Second, commentators who have
made a broader study of contract law have noted an expansion of
the Hadley rule to the benefit of the injured party.30 Third, there
has been a change in the disposition of cases which concern carri-
ers, cases involving the same type of contract or undertaking as
Hadley itself. Especially indicative of these changes is the court's
disposition of the injured party's claim in Koufos v. C. Czarnikow,
Ltd. (The Heron II).31 The Heron II changed the rule on conse-
27. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
28. Hadley involved the rendition of a service, the delivery of goods, not the sale of
goods themselves. Id. The rule of Hadley subsequently has extended to goods cases as
well.
29. See Smith, The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 16 LAw Q. REV. 275, 280 (1900).
[I]f there is added an appreciation of the damages which will proximately fol-
low on a failure to deliver, an appreciation which may depend on the knowledge of an
indefinite number of additionalfacts, he may well be liable.... Of the same act one
consequence may be natural in one set of circumstances, another in another.
Id. (emphasis added) (Smith was later Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor).
30. See F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
1111 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that "the restrictive interpretation of the true meaning of
Hadley v. Baxendale, current in the nineteenth century, has in this century gradually been
replaced by a more expansive one").
31. Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd. [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350 [The Heron II]; see infra
notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
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quential damages set forth in The Parana,3 2 a case which had
stood as precedent for almost one hundred years. The now dis-
carded rule in The Parana restricted recovery for wrongful delay
in delivery of goods (by sea) to interest on the value of the goods.
In contrast, The Heron II allowed recovery for the injured party's
loss of profits. The difference was a recovery of £4,183 instead of
£ 172. 33 This development is significant in that unlike Hadley, The
Heron II was decided by the House of Lords.
34
Many international cases may be decided by arbitration pro-
ceedings instead of by litigation. In light of this fact, another
indication of the trend toward better protection of the injured
party is found in the results of arbitration proceedings. Recent
literature indicates that there has been a gradual liberalization in
allowing recovery of consequential damages. 35 The arbitration
proceedings illustrate the key point-that the amount of knowl-
edge necessary to put the breaching party on notice has changed.
Three developments illustrate this point. In earlier proceed-
ings, if wrongful delay of a vessel resulted in losses due to such
events as changes in the market, prior notice of the special cir-
cumstances indicating this result was required.3 6 In a recent arbi-
tration proceeding, however, no notice was required to recover
for a loss caused by an increase in prices during the wrongful
delay of a vessel,37 a decision similar to the holding in The Heron
I. Gradual liberalization in allowing recovery of consequential
damages also may be observed in the approach taken by arbitra-
tion panels toward recovery of anticipated profits. While an ear-
lier proceeding illustrates an unwillingness to grant anticipated
profits, 38 an arbitration panel went so far in a later case as to con-
struct the anticipated profits on its own accord (because neither
32. The Parana, [1877] 2 P.D. 118.
33. For a short discussion of this, see Case Comment, Contract and Tort: Measures of
Damages, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 14 (1968).
34. Some terms in another earlier House of Lords' decision will be mentioned
below. See Monarch Steamship Co. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B), [19491 App. Cas.
196.
35. Bulow, supra note 6, at 622. Bulow's paper was presented at the VI Interna-
tional Congress of Maritime Arbitrators held in Monaco in 1983.
36. Kyosei Atlantic v. Steelmet Export Co., SMA No. 1383 (1979) (involving loss of
profits on the sale of cargo due to the late arrival of a ship); Amoco Trading Interna-
tional v. Azienda Lavorazione Minerali Affini, SMA No. 1043 (1975) (involving loss of a
purchase of crude oil due to failure to supply a vessel). Note: SMA refers to the Award
service of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators. See Bulow, supra note 6, at 622.
37. Phillips Petroleum Int'l (U.K.) v. Sentry Ref. Inc., SMA No. 1883 (1983).
38. Irene Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Metal Transport Corp. v. Luria Brothers &
Co., SMA No. 768 (1973).
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party's approach to damages was acceptable)A9 Finally, one arbi-
tration panel has awarded damages based on unjust enrich-
ment,40 a result suggested a few years earlier in an article
concerning recovery of lost profits under the UCC.41
V. THE BENEFITS OF THE TREND
To the extent that recovery is easier, the injured party's expec-
tations are more adequately protected than in the past. In the
past, leading cases expressed much concern that the seller of
services or goods in breach of contract not be burdened with a
large verdict. But those cases contain little discussion revealing
concern that the injured party will be burdened with an equally
large loss that will not be reimbursed because of failure to
recover damages.
Some sensitivity for the injured party appeared about ninety
years ago in a noted article on Hadley by F.E. Smith.42 Previously,
J. Mayne in his treatise on damages had shown sympathy for the
breaching party and asked, "[b]ut ought not the onus of making a
contract rather to lie on the party who seeks to extend the liabil-
ity of another than upon him who merely seeks to restrain his
own within its original limits?" In response to Mayne's sympa-
thy, Smith replied, "It]his argument seems to ignore completely
the rationale of the rule that 'everyone who breaks a contract
shall pay for its natural consequences.' "44 Smith further criti-
cized the rule that in cases of breach of contract by non-payment
of money, the damages were not to exceed legal interest from the
day that payment became due. Here, Smith argued, "a com-
pletely arbitrary standard is substituted for the principle of
compensation. "45
More recently, in the United States, an article by Richard
Schiro indicated sympathy for the buyer injured by the breach of
a sales contract and presented a rationale for minimum recov-
39. Earl Shipping Co. v. Afran Transport, SMA No. 1674B (1983).
40. See Bulow, supra note 6, at 630-31 (citing Sanko Steamship Co. v. Korea Ship-
ping Corp., SMA No. 1804 (1983); Maritime Overseas Corp. v. SPC Shipping Inc., SMA
No. 1801 (1983); Unimarine Inc. v. The Afghan Fertilizer Co., SMA No. 1703 (1982)).
41. See Schiro, Prospecting for Lost Profits in the Uniform Commercial Code: The Buyer's
Dilemmas, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1979).
42. See Smith, supra note 29.
43. J. MAYNE, DAMAGES, 30-31 (6th ed. 1899).
44. Smith, supra note 29, at 280.
45. Id. at 285-86.
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ery. 46 Before acknowledging some liberalization in favor of the
victim, 47 the author lamented, "[o]f the four elements in the
formula for recovering lost profits-causation, forseeability, cer-
tainty, and mitigation-it appears today that forseeability and
certainty work an unduly severe penalty upon nonbreaching buy-
ers seeking such recoveries in sales of goods transactions."
48
If there is even a gradual shift toward some concern for the
party injured by the breach of contract, such a shift certainly is
overdue. Consider some of the problems a U.S. plaintiff
encounters in the battle to be compensated adequately. The
plaintiff faces not only the court's requirement that damages be
foreseeable, but also the sometimes difficult task of proving with
certainty the amount of loss. 49 There are, of course, occasions
when the two requirements overlap, such as when a contingency
makes the plaintiff's loss both uncertain and unforeseeable.
50
While the law does not demand absolute certainty, 51 it does
require that the evidence establish the loss as reasonably cer-
tain. 52 There is no gauge by which to measure reasonableness
mechanically. In general, the courts have required greater cer-
tainty in cases of breach of contract than in tort cases. 53 For the
buyer who has suffered either because of a failure to receive
goods or because of a breach of warranty, the certainty rule, like
the rule requiring forseeability, has played an important role in
claims for lost profits. 54 In recognition of this trend, the require-
ments of the rule of certainty were intended to be relaxed under
the UCC. 55 There is, in fact, evidence that the UCC has eased
46. See Schiro, supra note 41.
47. Id. at 1752 (stating: "Nevertheless, as a prelude to the ensuing discussion on
'modernizing' the foreseeability and certainty rules, some trends can be discerned. Both
rules have been liberalized").
48. Id. at 1729.
49. For an explanation of the term "remote", see Bulow, infra note 130. It also
would be difficult to prove such losses with any degree of certainty.
50. For examples of this overlap, see Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages:
Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE LJ. 992, 998 n.35 (1956).
51. For example, the Fifth Circuit has stated that "in a suit on a contract, we do not
require exactness, only that there was enough evidence for the district court to estimate
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty." Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Kop-
pers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Fredonis Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA
Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 804 (5th Cir. 1973)).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979) (providing that "[d]amages
are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be estab-
lished with reasonable certainty").
53. See id. § 352 comment a.
54. See id.
55. The comments to two sections of the Uniform Commercial Code on damages
4251989]
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the requirement of certainty. 56
In the United States, the plaintiff has a further disadvantage in
suits for breach of contract. In theory, even if the plaintiff
prevails, only the expectation interest is protected; in reality, the
plaintiff is not going to break even. In England and the civil law
countries, a prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney's fees,57
while the U.S. plaintiff cannot recover money to pay court fees
not charged to the defendant or money to repay for time lost
gathering evidence and appearing in court. One function served
by the recovery of monetary awards for pain and suffering (if the
recovery is large enough) in personal injury cases is that the
plaintiff can pay the attorney from this award and still have
money remaining to cover out-of-pocket expenses. Because no
such recovery exists in a breach of contract suit against a seller of
goods, even a buyer who theoretically is made whole will in actu-
ality not be. Thus, for these many reasons, the injured party
does not fare well under the present rules. 58
Commentators have stated that one of the chief purposes for
awarding damages was to discourage breaches of contract. 59
Nevertheless, potential damages for breach of contract appar-
ently do not influence conduct enough. 60 This is not to say that
reject any requirement of mathematical accuracy in satisfying the certainty requirement.
One comment provides that one purpose of that section is "to reject any doctrine that
damages must be calculable with mathematical accuracy" and that "[clompensatory
damages ... have to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit,
but no more." U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1. Another section repeats this, referring to
section 1-106 without specifying it, adding "[loss may be determined in any manner
which is reasonable under the circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4.
After referring to the first of these comments, the Restatement states "[f]urthermore,
increasing receptiveness on the part of courts to proof by sophisticated economic and
financial data and by expert opinion has made it easier to meet the requirement of cer-
tainty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comment a (1979).
56. See Schiro, supra note 41, at 1753.
57. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 792, 798 (1966); Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Pay-
ments into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 301, 331 (1986).
58. See F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE, & A. KRONMAN, supra note 30, at 1113 (stating that
"[p]erhaps a good deal of the difficulty that the courts have had with damage theory over
the past hundred and thirty years is attributable to the fact that less-than-compensatory
formulae have, somehow, had to be squared with the 'compensation' idea, without, at
least overtly, abandoning either the formulae or the idea").
59. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 998 (1964) ("[T]he chief purposes for which
the remedy in damages for breach of contract is given are the prevention of similar
breaches in the future and the avoidance of private war.").
60. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1216 (1970) (stating that "[a]ll in all, our system of legal remedies for breach of con-
tract, heavily influenced by the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a
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the problems of the breaching party are never entitled serious
consideration. Some protection from liability is appealing in the
case of one who breaks a contract that is difficult to perform. For
some of these contracts, UCC section 2-615 permits the defense
of commercial impracticability. This defense mirrors some of the
requirements of the defense against liability for consequential
damages. The impracticability required by UCC section 2-615 is
not expressly described as unforeseen, but rather as "a contin-
gency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made." 6' Yet, the comments to that sec-
tion use as a clarifying term "unforeseen," 62 and courts inter-
preting section 2-615 speak of "foreseeability."63 If in a difficult
contract case the defendant is not successful in basing a defense
of impracticability on lack of foreseeability (so as to avoid liability
completely), the defendant still may be successful in using lack of
foreseeability to avoid some liability for consequential damages.
This is not to say that the same facts will be the basis of both
defenses, only that the lack of foreseeability may be the common
tool used in the two defenses. Once a court decides that the
breacher assumed the risk of performance and is liable, the
marked solicitude for men who do not keep their promises"); see also Mueller, Contract
Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833, 835 (1967) (noting:
"But even in the simple cases where the gamble both of establishing breach and of mak-
ing proof of full indemnifiable loss is reduced to a minimum, it is an open secret that a
contract breaker rarely stands to lose as much by his breach as he would by
performance").
61. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1987). Section 2-615 provides in pertinent part:
Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions Except so far as a seller may have
assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substi-
tuted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who com-
plies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a con-
tract of sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good
faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid ....
Id.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 1 ("excus[ing] a seller from timely delivery of
goods contracted for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable
because of unforeseen supervening circumstances"); see also U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4
(stating that "[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency").
63. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 990 (5th
Cir. 1976) (stating that "[e]xculpatory provisions which are phased merely in general
terms have long been construed as excusing only unforeseen events which make per-
formance impracticable"); Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (stating that the "[seller] would not prevail because the events ... were
reasonably foreseeable").
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breacher is liable for the general damages which were naturally
foreseeable, but not for other damages, unless the injury was
otherwise foreseeable. It is but a short step to argue that nobody
assumes the risk (or "foresees" the liability) of a duty to pay con-
sequential damages that are in an amount commercially
impracticable.
One must go further in the matter, however. An examination
of the commercial impracticability case allows a comparative look
at another matter concerning the distribution of gains and losses.
When the defense of impracticability is denied to a seller who
breaks a contract because of inflation, large costs may be
imposed on that seller. The argument can be made that this bur-
den is harsh and "undeserved."64 However, the costs which the
seller incurs are gains to the buyer. The counter-argument is
that the defense should be allowed "only when the satisfaction
sellers lose by enforcement outweighs the satisfaction buyers
gain by it."65
With the exception of the cases of the better risk-bearers, 66
there are few times when imposing liability for consequential
damages would mean that the breaching party (seller) would lose
more satisfaction than the injured party (buyer) would gain. This
situation is distinct from the impossibility case because the
injured party has already lost. Losses reimbursed by consequen-
tial damages are not gains to the injured party. The question
turns on whether the party will continue to bear the loss or theo-
retically "break even." If the party recovers, the recovery is only
a reimbursement. A third party gains here, if there has been a
gain at all. Consider two examples, breach of warranty resulting
in property damage and failure to deliver to a buyer who would
in return resell followed by inability to cover. If property has
been damaged, money may go to a contractor who rebuilds a
building, to another seller who sells replacement equipment, or
to a mechanic who repairs the damage. Even if the work is done
by employees of the injured party's own establishment, these
third parties still must be paid for labor. Others must be paid for
supplying materials. In the second case of failure to deliver,
either the buyer's customer did without (and there was no gain
64. See Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1976) (acknowledging
this argument).
65. Id. at 25.
66. See Stone, infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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on that end of the bargain), or someone else filled the order (and
gained thereby). This "someone else" earned the profit.
Finally, if the goal of denying damages is to encourage com-
merce, it is not clear why the seller has enjoyed such a favorable
position. While facing the possibility of huge liability would dis-
courage some from selling, surely facing the same liability (of a
loss not to be repaid and to an extent controlled by the seller's
willingness to perform) would discourage some from buying.
True, the buyer, more often than the seller, will understand the
true extent of the possible loss and can avoid the contract if the
loss would be too great. But do we not assume that, for Hadley to
apply, either the possible loss is one known by a reasonable per-
son or notice of it must have been given to the seller? To use a
current phrase, does not Hadley demand an "even playing field"?
Is commerce not benefitted by encouraging buyers to buy as
much as by encouraging sellers to sell?
VI. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON Hadley
Hadley v. Baxendale67 arose in nineteenth century England and
concerned a breach of contract by a carrier who was late deliver-
ing goods. For those students of law who may have forgotten,
the facts and result of Hadley can be briefly stated. A carrier
agreed with a mill owner to carry a broken engine shaft to the
manufacturer to serve as a pattern for the replacement shaft.
Delivery of the shaft was unnecessarily delayed for five days due
to the fault of the carrier. The mill owner sued for lost profits
because the mill was shut down those extra five days, the only
loss sustained as a result of the carrier's breach. There was, in
effect, no claim for direct damages, 68 only consequential dam-
67. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). A well-researched study of
the case and its background can be found in an article by Richard Danzig. See Danzig,
Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975).
The material also appeared, with some footnotes omitted, in R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at
76-107. Seegenerally R. DELDERFIELD, GIVE Us THIS DAY (1973); R. DELDERFIELD, GOD IS
AN ENGLISHMAN (1970); R. DELDERFIELD, THEIRS WAS THE KINGDOM (1971) (three
novels concerning a family in the business of carriage of goods by land from the 1850's
to the beginning of World War I tell a colorful story of the times and the business). One
of Delderfield's novels contains a reference to the firm sued in Hadley. On the page
preceding the dedication in THEIRS WAS THE KINGDOM is found: "The author gratefully
acknowledges the encouragement given him by the old-established firm of Messr. Pick-
ford." A reader not familiar with the Hadley case will understand this better by knowing
that Pickford & Co. was the transport company which broke the contract in that case.
Baxendale was the company's managing director.
68. These direct damages would have consisted of the value of the shaft's use dur-
ing the delay, its rental value. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. Perillo, Contracts 594 (2D ED. 1977).
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ages. 69 The court decided that the mill owner should not recover.
Even though five simple sentences establish the facts and result
of Hadley, disagreement about the import of the case still exists.
First, there is disagreement about the effect of Hadley with
respect to prior law. Conventional teaching is that awards were
more or less out of control before the case, with large awards
often going to the plaintiff.70 After Hadley, many authorities
believed that recoveries by plaintiffs were more limited. 71 On the
other hand, Gilmore suggests that the case expanded liability by
allowing for some lost profits and other consequential damages
that previously were not recoverable. 72 Gilmore asserts that this




Probably the best evaluation of the case is that it sets down a
principle and a rule. Fuller and Perdue state:
The [Hadley v. Baxendale] case may be said to stand for two
propositions: (1) that it is not always wise to make the default-
ing promisor pay for all the damage which follows as a conse-
quence of his breach, and (2) that specifically the proper test
for determining whether particular items of damage should be
compensable is to inquire whether they should have been
foreseen by the promisor at the time of the contract. The first
aspect of the case is much more important than the second. In
its first aspect the case bears an integral relation to the very
bases of contract liability. It declares in effect that just as it is
wise to refuse enforcement altogether to some promises (con-
siderationless, unaccepted, "social" promises, etc.) so it is not
wise to go too far in enforcing those promises which are
deemed worthy of legal sanction...
In its second aspect Hadley v. Baxendale may be regarded as
giving a grossly simplified answer to the question which its
first aspect presents. To the question how far shall we go in
charging to the defaulting promisor the consequences of his
breach, it answers with what purports to be a single test, that
of foreseeability. The simplicity and comprehensiveness of
this test are largely a matter of illusion. In the first place, it is
openly branded as inappropriate in certain situations where
69. This fact was admitted by counsel. See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147.
70. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 562-64 (1935) (sug-
gesting that Hadley limited juries' discretion in awarding damages to those which were
foreseeable at the time the parties contracted); see also R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 81-83
(drawing the same conclusion that Hadley abridged juries' discretion).
71. See G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 126 n.122 (concluding that Hadley's effect of
controlling large jury damage verdicts by making all damage questions matters of law
reviewable on appeal is a key aspect of the case).
72. Id. at 51-52.
73. Id. at 52.
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the line is drawn much more closely in favor of the defaulting
promisor than the test of foreseeability as normally under-
stood would draw it. There are, therefore, exceptions to the
test, to say nothing of authorities which reject it altogether as
too burdensome to the defaulter. In the second place, it is
clear that the test of foreseeability is less a definite test itself
than a cover for a developing set of tests. As in the case of all
"reasonable man" standards there is an element of circularity
about the test of foreseeability. "For what should he have
foreseen as a reasonable man? Those items of damage for
which the court feels he ought to pay." The test of foresee-
ability is therefore subject to manipulation by the simple
device of defining the characteristics of the hypothetical man
who is doing the foreseeing. By a gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion this "man" acquires a complex per-
sonality: we begin to know just what "he" can "foresee" in
this and that situation, and we end, not with one test but with a
whole set of tests.
74
The "first aspect" is a principle, a principle still evident in the
law of damages as manifested in the UCC, the Restatement, and
Article 74 of the C.I.S.G. The "second aspect" is what may be
called the "rule" of the case. Because of the manipulation
referred to by Fuller and Perdue, however, that rule no longer
retains its original wording-or seeming intent-in the cases, the
UCC, the Restatement, or the C.I.S.G.
The "rule" 75 was that the damages "should be such as may
fairly and reasonable [sic] be considered either [1] arising natu-
rally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such
breach of contract itself, or [2] such as may reasonably be sup-
posed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it."76 The Hadley rule, like Article 74 of the C.I.S.G., may be
described as "a general rule for the calculation of damages for
every loss suffered as a consequence of a breach of contract."
77
The second area of disagreement, a minor one, is whether the
74. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 84-
85 (1936).
75. See Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 158 Eng. Rep. 87, 91 (Ex. 1860) (opinion
by Baron Wilde). The court stated that
although an excellent attempt was made in Hadley v. Baxendale to lay down a rule
on the subject, it will be found that the rule is not capable of meeting all cases:
and when the matter comes to be further considered, it will probably turn out
that there is no such thing as a rule as to the legal measure of damages applica-
ble in all cases.
Id.
76. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854).
77. See Knapp, supra note 21, at 539.
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rule consists of two parts or of only one part. The rule is often
discussed as being two rules or one rule in two parts, 78 an
approach reflected in the British Sale of Goods Act. 79 Sometimes
the part, or "branch," of the rule following [1], above, is referred
to as "Hadley 1" and that following [2] as "Hadley 2". Damages
are recoverable under the "first rule" whether they are "contem-
plated" or not; the damages are such that in the ordinary course,
anyone should realize that those damages will follow naturally
from a breach. These damages are referred to as ordinary or
general damages. Damages are recoverable under the "second
rule," however, only if the damages are "contemplated." Some-
thing else must cause this contemplation; one example is the
knowledge of a reasonable person or perhaps a reasonable
merchant. Another example is proper notice by the plaintiff to
the defendant before the breach.80
78. See A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 874 (1982); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, at 441-42; Bulow, supra note 6, at 623. The New York Law Revision Commis-
sion, when considering the adoption of the U.C.C. and considering in particular § 2-7 10
(incidental damages), concluded that the "first branch" of the rule allowed recovery of
incidental damages. See 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 696
(1980) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]; see also Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (holding that the Hadley 2 rule requiring that the damages be in con-
templation of the parties does not apply to incidental as distinguished from consequent-
ial damages); The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350, 357-59, 379 (showing that when
counsel for the respondents argued that it was a Hadley 1 case, counsel for the appel-
lants did not dispute this point); Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus.,
[1949] 2 K.B. 528, 536 (C.A.) (referring to the judge below, Lord Asquith stated "that
the loss of profit claimed was . . . recoverable, if at all, only under the second rule in
Hadley v. Baxendale").
79. See The Sale of Goods Act (1893), reprinted in M. CHALMERS, THE SALE OF GOODS
ACT 1893 § 50(2) (1924) (measuring the seller's damages in a suit for non-acceptance of
the goods); id. § 51(2) (measuring damages for non-delivery); id. § 53(2) (measuring
damages for breach of warranty). Reflecting the Hadley 1 rule, all three sections contain
an identical provision stating that "[t]he measure of damages is the estimated loss
directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the . . . breach.
Id. §§ 50(2), 51(2), 53(2)."
Reflecting the Hadley 2 rule, section 54 expresses the sentiment of the case, though it
does not repeat the rule, by allowing "special" damages. In pertinent part, it states that
"[n]othing in this Act shall affect the right of the buyer or the seller to recover interest
or special damages in any case where by law interest or special damages may be recover-
able, or to recover money paid where the consideration for the payment of it has failed."
Id. § 54.
80. This notice was believed to have occurred in Hadley itself, although there was
some confusion about this part of the case. Several writers seemed to think the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale was not followed in Hadley v. Baxendale. "Thus, in Hadley v. Baxendale
itself, the carrier was told of the use to which the broken shaft was to be put and that the
mill was shut down, but it was held that this was not enough, since it was not told that
another shaft was not available!" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 573; see also A. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 78, at 874 n.7 (stating that the resulting loss of the miller's profits
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Several commentators have concluded that there are actually
three rules."' This conclusion follows from a further part of the
Hadley opinion.8 2 These commentators create three rules by
splitting the second rule of Hadley into two parts. The first rule
remains the same. Under the new second rule, the damages are
"contemplated" if a "reasonable man in the position of the
promisor would have foreseen" that they would result from the
breach "in the great multitude of cases." 8 3 Under the new third
rule, damages are "contemplated" if they "flow from special cir-
cumstances of the contract that were communicated to the
breaching party at the time the contract was made."
8 4
At the other extreme, several commentators have contended
that there is no "rule on the legal measure of damages that
applies in all cases."
8 5
Finally, other commentators contend that there is really just
one rule, "for damages which may reasonably be supposed to
have been contemplated by the contracting parties, are damages
could not then have been contemplated by the carrier since the carrier may have
believed the miller would have a spare shaft); Fuller and Perdue, supra note 74, at 86
(same).
Any inconsistency between the words and the result did not seem to bother Mayne,
who also reported that the clerk had been informed. SeeJ. MAYNE, supra note 43, at 7.
The reason for the confusion was that in a part of the report of the case it was said that
notice had been given to one of the carrier's clerks by someone from the mill. See Hadley,
156 Eng. Rep. at 145, 147. However, in Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman
Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 537 (C.A.), it was noted that this statement must have been in
error or else the case would have gone the other way. See infra note 111 for this explana-
tion by Lord Asquith. For discussion on whether this might have been an agency prob-
lem, since notice to the company might not have been sufficient to charge the company,
see R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 86-87.
81. W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-715:03, at 395 (1984).
82. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). The relevant portion of
Hadley states:
Now if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made
were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus made known
to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such contract, which
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which
would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under those special circum-
stances so known and communicated. On the other hand, if these special cir-
cumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at
most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not
affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.
Id. at 151.
83. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 81, at 354.
84. Id.
85. See Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 158 Eng. Rep. 87, 91 (Ex. 1860).
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which naturally arise from a breach of contract."8 6 That is true
enough. Dividing the law into two rules reminds one of the leg-
endary farmer who had a large cat and a small cat. The farmer
cut two holes in his barn door, a large one for the large cat to
enter and a small one for the small cat. Just as the large hole
would have done for both, so "contemplated damages" could
apply both to damages which are contemplated because they
"naturally arise" and to damages contemplated because some
special information was possessed by the parties. Ignoring the
separate "branches" also saves an analyst from having to decide
which part is applied in a case where the answer is not certain.
Nevertheless, dividing the rule into two parts helps analyze
given situations.87 If the damages follow naturally as a result of
the breach, as general damages, the court need look no further.
But if the damages are of the type contemplated, foreseeable,
only when the buyer or some other source gives the seller special
information, that is, notice of the potential loss, the court must
decide if the source adequately did so. The court must first, of
course, decide which of these two situations is presented by the
facts of the case.8 8 Because Article 74 of the C.I.S.G. does not
contain two parts, or branches, there is no need to conceptualize
into which part of the Hadley rule a loss goverened by the C.I.S.G.
belongs. Under Article 74 of the C.I.S.G., damage is classified as
either foreseeable or not foreseeable.
86. Smeed v. Foord, 120 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1040 (K.B. 1859) (Crompton, J.). In The
Heron H case, Lord Reid wrote as if the rule had two "branches" saying:
[I]n cases like Hadley v. Baxendale or the present case ... [t]he crucial question is
whether . . . [the defendant] should . . . have realised that such loss was suffi-
ciently likely ... to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed naturally from
the breach or that loss of that kind should have been within his contemplation.
The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350, 385. Lord Reid went on to state, however, that,
"I do not think that it was intended that there were to be two rules or that two different
standards or tests to be applied." Id.; see also Adams, "Hadley v. Baxendale" and the Con-
tract/Tort Dichotomy, 8 ANGLO-Am. L. REV. 147 (1979) (stating that the two "limbs" of
Hadley tend to be seen today as merely parts of a single rule); James, Measure of Damages
in Contract and Tort-Law and Fact, 13 MOD. L. REV. 36, 39 (1950) (arguing that both parts
of the Hadley rule "are only alternative ways of stating the same proposition"); Smith,
supra note 29, at 277 (reaching the same conclusion that "Hadley v. Baxendale then lays
down one positive rule, and one only").
87. G. CHESHIRE & C. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 493 n. I (3d ed. 1952) (in giving
their reason for subdividing the rule, the authors stated that "in a textbook at any rate, it
facilitates exposition to deal separately with the normal and abnormal").
88. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 416 (stating that "there is sometimes differ-
ence of opinion as to which is the part [i.e. Hadley 1 or Hadley 2] which governs a
particular case and it may be that both parts govern it"). No case is cited or example
given.
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VII. CONSIDERING CLAUSES IN ARTICLE 74
Seven clauses in Article 74 are the "bare bones" which a court
must analyze. These clauses are: "Such damages may not
exceed" the loss which "the party in breach" "foresaw or ought
to have foreseen" "at the time of the conclusion of the contract"
in light of the "facts and matters of which he then knew or ought
to have known" "as a possible" "consequence of the breach of
contract". Let us examine each of these provisions.
(a). The "party in breach"
For recovery, Hadley requires that a loss be "in the contem-
platon of the parties." Does it make any difference that Article
74 of the C.I.S.G. refers to only one of the parties? The C.I.S.G.
article, in limiting reference to the party in breach, surely does
not envision delivering a windfall to the plaintiff, because the
plaintiff recovers something not foreseen. Rather, this language
reflects the view that the focus should be on the party who will
have to answer for the amount of the loss.8 9 No case has been
found in which recovery was denied because the injured party did
not foresee the loss.
(b). "Foresaw or ought to have foreseen"
The choice of "foresaw" and "ought to have foreseen" instead
of Hadley's "in the contemplation of the parties" is especially sig-
nificant in light of British cases. The question is whether the
choice of the word "foreseeable" (short for "ought to have fore-
seen") instead of "contemplated" should make a difference in
the scope of liability. 90 A plain reading of the words suggests
that a difference in the scope of liability apparently is intended.
Under Hadley, the damages must actually be "contemplated" and
not merely "foreseeable." Thus, a rule that provides that dam-
ages only need to be "foreseeable" surely ought to narrow the
89. A. CORBIN, supra note 59, § 1010.
The question always turns on whether the defendant had reason to foresee the
injury. No doubt the plaintiff nearly always knows his own business and cir-
cumstances better than the defendant .... Therefore, when courts say that both
must have had reason to foresee the injury, the meaning is that the defendant must
have had reason to foresee it.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R.
525, 532 (opinion by Lord Denning stating that "I find it difficult to ... draw a distinc-
tion between what a man 'contemplates' and what he 'foresees.' I soon begin to get out
of my depth. I cannot swim in this sea of semantic exercises").
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limitations of Hadley and widen the scope of recovery. 9' Indeed,
the House of Lords in The Heron II, as will be shown below,
thought that such a term would do so and explicitly rejected the
word "foreseeable."92 Yet is the connotation of "contemplation"
used in legal circles in 1854, the year Hadley was decided, clear?
Could it be that "foreseeable" and "in the contemplation" were
interchangeable at that time?
An analysis of this point can be made by referring to the Loui-
siana Civil Code, which was translated into English both before
and after Hadley. Before Hadley was decided, the Civil Code's sec-
tion on consequential damages had used both "contemplated"
(and "contemplation") and "foreseeable." In the Civil Code of
1825, Article 1928 provided that when the party breaching the
contract had not been guilty of fraud or bad faith, that party was
liable only for such damages as were "contemplated, or may rea-
sonably supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the
parties." When the "inexecution" had proceeded from fraud or
bad faith, however, the breaching party "shall not only be liable
to such damages as were, or might have been foreseen at the time
of making the contract, but also such as are the immediate and
direct consequence of the breach of that contract. 93 The French
91. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 876-77.
92. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 385.
93. Civil Code of 1825, Article 1934 provided:
Where the object of the contract is anything but the payment of money, the
damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount of the loss he has
sustained, and the profit of which he has been deprived, under the following
exceptions and modifications:
1. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only
for such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to
have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract.
By bad faith in this and the next rule, it is not meant the mere breach of faith in
not complying with the contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive
of interest or ill will.
2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad
faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or might have
been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to such as are the
immediate and direct consequence of the breach of the contract; but even
when there is fraud, the damages cannot exceed this.
The wording in the 1825 Code was translated from the French:
Lorsque l'objet du contrat consiste dans toute autre chose que le payement
d'une somme d'argent, les dommages dfls au cr~ancier pour la violation du
contrat, sont de la perte qu'il a faite, ou du gain dont il a &6 priv6, sauf les
exceptions et les modifications ci-apres:
1. Lorsque le d~biteur n'a &6 coupable d'aucune fraude on mauvaise foi, il
n'est sujet qu'aux dommages que les parties ont eu ou peuvent raisonnable-
ment &tre suppos~es avoir eu en vue, au temps du contrat ....
2. Quand l'inex6cution du contrat est le r6sultat de la fraude ou de la
mauvaise foi, le d~biteur est sujet, non seulement A tous les dommages qui ont
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version from which the Code was translated used "avoir eu en
vue" ("have had in view", literally) in the first paragraph and
"prevus" (foreseen) in the second, and Article 1934 of the
Revised Civil Code of 1870 (after Hadley, that is) used this same
translation.94 Could the words have been interchangeable to the
French at that time?
Interestingly, in his treatise, McCormick refers to the French
Civil Code which "includes clearly the idea adopted in Hadley v.
Baxendale" and then offers his own translation: "A debtor is only
liable for the damages [and interest] which have been foreseen or
which could have been foreseen . . . ."95 The quote is from a 1930
translation of the Code from the French.
9 6
To return to the use of both "contemplated" and "foresee-
able" in the Louisiana Code, two possibilities exist. First, there
may have been three categories of damages: "contemplated"
damages, "foreseeable" damages, and "immediate and direct"
damages. Alternatively, there may have been two categories:
"contemplated" (or "foreseeable," an interchangeable word)
and "immediate and direct." This second possibility is the more
probable if, in the clause covering fraud and bad faith, "not only"
preceding "foreseeable" was used to indicate "not only foresee-
able - or contemplated if you will, as used above in the section on
good faith breach." On the other hand, it is possible that "not
only ... but also" indicated "both foreseeable [a new category in
k6 ou pu tre pr~vus S l'6poque o6i le contrat a et6 fait, mais encore A ceux qui
sont la consequence imm6diate et directe de la violation du contrat.
COMPILED ED. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934 (1972).
The reader may wish to compare similar wording in the French text of the C.I.S.G.
Article 74: "[ces dommages-int~rts ne peuvent tre sup~rieurs A la perte subie et au
gain manqu6 que la partie en d~faut avait pr~vus ou aurait dfi pr6voir au moment de la
conclusion du contrat .... C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 74.
The present Louisiana Code sections (dating from 1984) both use "foreseeable":
Art. 1996. Obligor in good faith.
An obligor in good faith is liable only for the damages that were foreseeable at the time
the contract was made.
Art. 1997. Obligor in bad faith.
An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct
consequence of his failure to perform. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1996-97 (West 1987).
94. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1934 (West 1987).
95. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 563 n.10 (emphasis added).
96. See id. For a later translation, see G. BERMANN, H. DE VRIES, & N. GALSON,
FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION (1989). "Art. 1150. The obli-
gor is liable only for the damages foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the
time of the contract, so long as it is not due to his fraud that the obligation has not been
performed." Id. art. 1150.
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addition to "contemplated" used in the section on good faith
breach] ... and those that are immediate and direct [another new
category]." The division into only two categories would indicate
that in the legal circles of the time, the two words were
interchangeable.
Assuming there were two categories of damages, there are also
at least two possibilities concerning the Hadley court's choice of''contemplation" instead of "foreseeable." Both possibilities
assume that the court looked to the French Civil Code for guid-
ance. 97 The first possibility is that, as Hadley did not make a dis-
tinction between good faith breaches and fraudulent or bad faith
breaches, the judges, deeming the two words interchangeable,
arbitrarily chose the first word that appeared. The second possi-
bility is that, as Hadley was not concerned with a bad faith breach,
the judges, though considering the words interchangeable,
picked the word that appeared with the rule concerned with
breaches not in bad faith.
Whatever the connotation in Hadley's day, in time, most
authorities in the United States 9 8-and some in England 9 9-
equated "foreseeable" with "in the contemplation of the parties"
and concluded that Hadley established a rule of foreseeability.
The UCC, section 2-715(2), 0 allows for consequential damages
in breaches of contracts for the sale of goods. Although the UCC
uses the expression "had reason to know" rather than "contem-
plated" or "foreseeable," Hadley v. Baxendale is generally
97. Several sources suggest that the Hadley court was influenced by the French Civil
Code. See, e.g., R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 82 (commenting that the Hadley opinion men-
tioned the "sensible rule" adopted by the French); Smith, supra note 29, at 278.
98. Corbin contended that Hadley had adopted a "foreseeability" test. See A.
CORBIN, supra note 59, § 1007 (explaining that natural consequences are those which are
foreseeable). Corbin also commented that allowing recovery for injuries that are the
natural result of the breach "seems to have no meaning other than that there was reason
to foresee such injury." Id. § 1011; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 565 (stating
that Hadley "lays down a general standard of foreseeability of damage as at the time of
the bargain"). A very recent U.S. case held the defendants liable because failure of cash
registers to work would foreseeably create additional labor costs. See Cricket Alley Corp.
v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 732 P.2d 719, 724-25 (Kan. 1987).
99. H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 536
(Scarman,J.) (expressing the view that any difference between "reasonably foreseeable"
and "reasonably contemplated" was semantic). Until The Heron H decision, English
cases reflected the same view. See, e.g., Monarch Steamship Co. v. Karlshamns
Oljefabriker (A/B), [1949] App. Cas. 196, 214-15 (Lord Porter uses language such as
"could reasonably have been foreseen" and "a shipowner ought to have foreseen" along
with "ought reasonably have contemplated").
100. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-715, see infra note 177.
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accepted as the source of that section.' 0 1 Restatement section
351(2) uses "foreseeable," and (2)(b) uses "foreseeable
because ... [the party in breach had] reason to know"; 0 2 the
language "in the contemplation of" is not used.
As a final observation, although nineteenth-century judges may
have thought "in the contemplation of" and "foreseeable" to be
interchangeable, later judges may not have agreed, instead
believing that "foreseeable" demanded a more generous result,
and decided the cases accordingly. In the New York Study of the
UCC, one finds that three decades ago there was a thought that
changing the contemplation wording would make a difference in
the results of applying the test.' 03 The study further indicated
that the results of other cases supported this conclusion.
10 4
There could be another explanation in the sale of goods cases,
however. A liberal application of the requirement of foreseeabil-
ity may, for instance, be due to a combination of the influence of
Professor Corbin, UCC section 2-715(2), and the suggestions
found in the Comments to section 2-715(2).105
Whatever the cause of liberalization in the United States, the
British case, The Heron II, rejected "foreseeable" in favor of the
"contemplation" test.'0 6
(c). "As a possible" (and more on "foreseeable")
The phrase "as a possible consequence" appears in Article 74,
while Hadley chose "as a probable result." Neither "possible"
nor "probable" appears in UCC section 2-715,107 but the
Restatement section 351 uses "probable."'' 08 Thus the language
101. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 445-46.
102. For the full text of the Restatement § 351, see infra note 236.
103. 1 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 78, at 702. "As to [consequential] damages, it
may fairly be said that the New York courts have generally purported to follow the 'con-
templation' test and that the application of this test has narrowed recovery of damages
• . .probably more than would the 'had reason to know' test of the Code." Id. (footnote
omitted).
104. Id. at 702. "In view of [the] divergences in New York case law, it seems that the
test adopted in Section 2-715(2)(a) .. .will probably liberalize [present New York law]
somewhat, in accordance with the Restatement test and the trend of more recent cases
in the state courts." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Comment, supra note 50, at 1009
(noting that "[e]ven more significant is the decreasing effect of the foreseeability rule as
a limitation on damages").
105. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 445-47 (discussing the influence of
these three elements in the development of the present foreseeability test).
106. See The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350.
107. See infra note 177.
108. See infra note 236.
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of the C.I.S.G. ostensibly widens the area of liability imposed
upon a breaching party. Hopefully, "possible" will not cause in
international sales cases the same speculation that "probable"
has caused in the British cases.
A leading case on consequential damages in the mid-twentieth
century, Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Industries,10 9
involved the sale of a large boiler which was late being delivered.
The plaintiffs claimed as part of the damages the loss of profits
from lucrative special contracts. Recovery was denied because
the defendants had no knowledge of these special contracts. The
suit was not against the carrier, as in Hadley, but instead against
the seller. Victoria Laundry explained one question that had puz-
zled some people-was the rule of Hadley applied in Hadley or
not?" 0 The headnote in Hadley stated that the carrier's clerk was
given notice about the shaft's being needed to run the mill. If the
clerk was given notice, why was recovery not allowed by the
court? Victoria Laundry explained that the headnote was mislead-
ing about the notice, and that notice was not actually given." t '
Another contribution of the case was an attempt by Lord Asquith
to describe the required degree of probability that the loss would
occur. Lord Asquith effectively described it as "liable to result,"
and such that "a reasonable man" "could foresee" that the loss
was "likely so to result," or a "serious possibility," or "a real
danger," and the probability was "on the cards."112 Prior cases
109. See Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 536
(C.A.).
110. See supra note 80.
111. Victoria Laundy, [1949] 2 K.B. at 537.
The head-note is definitely misleading in so far as it says that the defendant's
clerk, who attended at the office, was told that the mill was stopped and that the
shaft must be delivered immediately. The same allegation figures in the state-
ment of facts which are said on page 344 to have "appeared" at the trial before
Crompton, J. If the Court of Exchequer had accepted these facts as estab-
lished, the court must, one would suppose, have decided the case the other way
round ... But it is reasonably plain from Alderson B.'s judgment that the court
rejected this evidence ....
Id.
112. Id. at 540.
In order to make the contract-breaker liable under [Hadley] it is not necessary
that he should actually have asked himself what loss is liable to result from a
breach . . . It suffices that, if he had considered the question, he would as a
reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was liable to result ...
Nor ... to make a particular loss recoverable, need it be proved that upon a
given state of knowledge the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee
that a breach must necessarily result in that loss. It is enough if he could fore-
see it was likely so to result. It is indeed enough ... if the loss (or some factor
without which it would not have occurred) is a "serious possibility" or a "real
danger". For short, we have used the word "liable" to result. Possibly the
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had similarly offered various phrases to explain the meaning of
"probable."' 13
Twenty yers later, however, the Law Lords of the House of
Lords in The Heron 11, thoroughly critiqued Lord Asquith's state-
ments.1 14 The Heron II involved a suit against a shipowner for
delay in carrying sugar; the consequential damages sought con-
sisted of money lost because the price of sugar had dropped dur-
ing the delay."15 In Victoria Laundry, Lord Asquith said that the
party injured by a breach was entitled to recover "such part of
the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract rea-
sonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach."'
1 6 In
The Heron II, Lord Reid did not agree, saying that a great many
"extremely unlikely results are reasonably foreseeable."'' 7 Also
criticized were the phrases "liable to result",'' a "serious possi-
bility", "a real danger", and "on the cards."' "1
9 Lord Pearce, on
the other hand, wrote that the "language of the judgement in the
Victoria Laundry case was a justifiable and valuable clarification of
the principles which Hadley v. Baxendale intended to express.
Even if it went further than that, it was in my opinion right."
120
Nevertheless, the views of the remaining justices were closer to
Lord Reid's than to Lord Pearce's.'
2 '
colloquialism "on the cards" indicates the meaning with some approach to
accuracy.
Id.
113. See, e.g., R. & H. Hall Ltd. v. W. H. Pim (Junior) & Co., 33 Com. Cas. 324, 329-
30 (1928) (Lord Dunedin stating: "I do not think that 'probability' . . . means that the
chances are all in favour of the event happening. To make a thing probable, it is
enough, in my view, that there is an even chance of it happening."); see also id. at 336
(Lord Phillimore referred to "those damages which ... are ... recognized by the parties
as those which in a particular case may result from a breach .... There may be cases
where the word to be used might be 'will,' but there are also cases and more common
cases where the word to use is 'may'.").
114. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350.
115. Id. at 406.
116. Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 539
(C.A.).
117. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 389.
118. Id. at 389.
119. The first two of these quotations, a "serious possibility" and a "real danger,"
both of which appear in Victoria Laundry, [1949] 2 K.B. at 540, are credited to Lord du
Parcq in Monarch Steamship Co., [1949] App. Cas. 196, 233-34, rather than Lord Asquith.
Lord Asquith also used the colloquial phrase "on the cards" to indicate "the shade of
meaning" of the phrase "liable to result." Victoria Laundry, [1949] 2 K.B. at 540. Lord
Reid went so far in his criticism as to say, "If the tests of 'real danger' or 'serious possi-
bility' . . . are to prevail in the future then let us cease to pay lip service to the rule in
Hadley v. Baxendale." The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 390.
120. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 417.
121. Lord Upjohn did not think that Lord Asquith intended to alter the law. "If he
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The justices in The Heron II gave individual views of "prob-
able" and rejected the use of the term "foreseeable." 122 The rea-
son was that "foreseeable" was the test for damages in torts, not
breaches of contract, and that "foreseeable" was a different con-
cept from "contemplat[ed]."123 However, they unanimously held
that the party injured by the breach was entitled to loss-of-market
damages.
The British cases, unlike U.S. cases, reflect a formal approach
to contract damages.124 In addition to indicating a different
approach, The Heron II, in rejecting the use of "foreseeable,"
[did] .. .I would disagree with him." Id. at 424. Lord Hodson found guidance in the
expression "in the great multitude of cases" but did not directly reject "liable to result."
Id. at 411. Although the principles set down in Victoria Laundry had been referred to as
creating a "landmark," id. at 389, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest simply described Lord
Asquith's opinion as "a most valuable analysis of the rule [of Hadley]." Id. at 399.
122. Lord Reid thought that he should contemplate that the fall in price was "not
unlikely to occur." Id. at 388. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest thought that he should con-
template that the fall was "liable to result or at least was not unlikely to result." Id. at
406. Lord Hodson also chose "liable to result." Id. at 410. Finally, the expressions "a
serious possibility" or "a real danger" [that the price would fall], taken from Monarch
Steamship Co., [1949] App. Cas. at 233, were chosen by Lords Pearce and Upjohn. The
Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 425.
123. The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. at 422.
So the claim for damages [for breach of contract] must be the natural conse-
quence of the breach or in the contemplation of the parties. But in tort a dif-
ferent test has been adopted.. and I cannot accept the argument ... thatthey
remain the same. The test in tort . . . is that the tortfeasor is liable for any
damage which he can reasonably foresee may happen as a result of the
breach .... So the rules as to assessment of damages have diverged in the two
cases, and nowadays the concept of "foreseeability" and "contemplation of the
parties" are different concepts in the law.
Id. at 422 (opinion by Lord Upjohn).
[Also,] I am satisfied that the court did not intend that every type of damage
which was reasonably foreseeable by the parties when the contract was made
should either be considered as arising naturally, i.e., in the usual course of
things, or be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties....
The parties are not supposed to contemplate as grounds for the recovery of
damage any type of loss or damage which on the knowledge available to the
defendant would appear to him as only likely to occur in a small minority of
cases.
Id. at 385 (opinion by Lord Reid).
124. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAw 84 (1987). Commenting on this, the two authors recently wrote:
In the English law of contract . . .the position overall remains more formal
than in America. For example, the English law of contractual damages contin-
ues to be treated by judges and writers as governed by highly formal rules.
Even with respect to problems which are inherently difficult to force into a
framework of formal rules - such as the foreseeability principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale - English courts still try to formulate the law in terms of specific for-
mal rules and most English judges try (if, as some may think, rather futilely) to
apply these rules formally.
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adopted a British rule altogether different from the US. rule.
125
The language of the British rule makes it less likely that the
defendant will have to pay consequential damages.
1 26 At least
one conclusion can be drawn from this fact. As things stand now,
U.S. cases should be more favorable for the injured party than
British cases; 127 and if "foreseeable" and "possible" are meas-
ures of result, cases under Article 74 should provide more
favorable recoveries also.
Nevertheless, this unfavorable position in England should be
true only for "internal" or "national" cases. In measuring conse-
quential damages in international sales, courts in England do not
object to the use of either "foreseeable" or "possible." For,
while England has not yet adopted the C.I.S.G., it has adopted
the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods (U.S.I.L.), Article 82 of which provides for the
recovery of consequential damages which the party "ought to
have foreseen.., as a possible consequence of the breach of the
contract." 1
2 8
125. See Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 7 INT'L ENCY. COMP. L., ch. 16, at 64
(1976) [hereinafter Remedies for Breach] (concluding that in England, especially after The
Heron H, the tendency is not to use foreseeability as a test; instead, the courts refer to
consequences "within the contemplation of the parties" which may mean more highly
probable than foreseeable). However, there is an indication that the expression 'fore-
seeability' is usable in English contract cases, even though it does not serve the same
purpose as in the United States. As Treitel has noted: "It is clear that a higher degree
of probability is required to satisfy the test of remoteness in contract than in tort and
that in contract cases the expression "foreseeability" refers to this higher degree of
probability." G. TREITEL, THE LAw OF CONTRACT 644 (4th ed. 1975).
126. Although the Restatement was copyrighted in 1981, and The Heron II case was
decided in 1967, no mention is made of the case in the Reporter's Notes. Nevertheless,
consideration was given to some English cases during the drafting period. In addition
to Hadley, another old case, Cory v. Thames Ironworks & Shipbuilding Co., 3 L.R.-Q.B.
181 (1868), is the basis of an illustration. Of the modern cases, the only English one
mentioned is Victoria Laundry. So the influence, if any, of The Heron H as a common law
case is not indicated.
127. Considering the remark ofJudge Scarman, supra note 99, made nine years after
The Heron H, matters are not entirely clear.
128. England adopted both of the two 1964 Hague Conventions by enacting the
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods. See 39 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND & WALES 20, 38 (4th ed. 1988).
Article 82 of the Convention provides:
Where the contract is not avoided, damages for a breach of contract by one
party shall consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered
by the other party. Such damages shall not exceed the loss which the party in
breach ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in
the light of the facts and matters which then were known or ought to have been
known to him, as a possible consequence of the breach of the contract.
Convention Relating to the Uniform Sale of Goods, supra note 11.
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Before leaving the concept, consider two connotations of fore-
seeable: remoteness and causation. In looking at the remoteness
connotation, consider trying to determine if the legendary black-
smith (or farrier) who does a bad job replacing the horse's shoe
should be liable for the loss of the battle or the war or the king-
dom. 129 Should the answer depend on whether or not the black-
smith could foresee the loss? In U.S. case law, such problems of
remoteness have been considered adequately covered by the
"foreseeability" test.' 30 In British law, the rule of Hadley also has
been said to serve this purpose.13' However, the same is not true
129. Horror stories of this kind appear occasionally. One was told by Judge Willes,
and Smith commented:
In British Columbia Saw-mills Co. v. Nettleship, 3 L.R.-C.P. 508, Willes J. refers to"the old case said to have been decided about two centures and a half ago,
where a man going to be married to an heiress, his horse having cast a shoe in
the journey, employed a blacksmith to replace it, who did the work so unskill-
fully that the horse was lamed and the rider not arriving in time, the lad mar-
ried another and the blacksmith was held liable for the loss of the marriage." It
is hardly necessary to observe that the man of the anvil, even with notice of his
customer's errand, could hardly have apprehended in the bride an animus
nubendi so imperious and undiscriminating.
Smith, supra note 29, at 279.
A similar story appears in Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 493 (1858), about a Canon of
a church who because "of the non-delivery of a horse pursuant to an agreement, was
prevented from arriving at this residence in time to collect his tithes." According to
Farnsworth, the original source is probably 1 R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 91-92 (W. Evans trans. 1806). A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 841 n. 13.
One U.S. court gave its answer to the problem of the poorly shod horse and the lost
kingdom: "But in an action against the farrier, it would not have done to look beyond
the loss of the shoe. To have charged him with accidental consequences would have
worked his ruin." Hargous v. Ablon & Boyd, 5 Hill 472, 474 (N.Y.), aff'd, 3 Denio 406
(1843).
130. A. CORBIN, supra note 59, § 997. Corbin stated:
It is clear that mere remoteness in time or space is not in itself sufficient to
prevent the recovery of damages for an injury. If the defendant in fact foresaw
the injury and his conduct was planned to induce it, the fact that the train [sic]
laid by him was a long one is immaterial. The extent of time or distance
between the beach and the injury is to be considered in determining whether
the latter could have been, or ought to have been, or was in fact foreseen by the
defendant.
Id.; see also NEW YORE REPORT, supra note 78, at 702:
The term "consequential" damages is not a precise term, as it has sometimes
been used to mean "too-remote-in-causation" damages. However, ordinarily itmeans damages deemed more remote than, or less foreseeable at the time of
contracting than, the standard damages (market-price measure for non-deliv-
ery, rental value for delay, etc.).
KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES § 1.04[2], at 1-14 (1986) ("In contract cases, the
remoteness concept is usually expressed in terms of the 'foreseeability' doctrine spring-
ing from the landmark decision in Hadley v. Baxendale."); Bulow, supra note 6, at 631. It is
not clear to this author whether "remote" was used as it is being used at this point in
Bulow's article or as the equivalent of "uncertain" or whether the losses referred to
were both uncertain and remote.
131. A. GUEST, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 555 (25th ed. 1979) (footnote omitted)
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under the French Civil Code because, as one authority points
out, 13 2 French law draws a distinction between damage which
could have been foreseen, 3 3 and damage which is remote (or
indirect). 34 Still, the principle of foreseeability was adopted as
the leading test of remoteness in the U.S.I.L., an indication that
the concept has some acceptance outside the common law
system.1
35
In looking at "causation," suppose that a breach of contract
causes an interruption of the victim's cash flow so that creditors
force the victim out of business. The defendant argues that this
situation was caused by the inherent weakness of the victim's
financial condition rather than the breach.136 In this case, causa-
tion may be handled as a separate problem by the court.'
37 Going
("Certain losses may be too 'remote', and for these the plaintiff is not entitled to com-
pensation. The foundation of the law on this subject is contained in the judgment of
Alderson B. in the Court of Exchequer in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale."); see G.
TREITEL, supra note 125, at 642; Smith, supra note 29, at 277-79.
132. Remedies for Breach, supra note 125, at 59.
133. The French Civil Code provides: "The obligor is liable only for the damages
foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time of the contract, so long as it is
not due to his fraud that the obligation has not been performed." CODE CIVIL [C. cIV.]
art. 1150 (Fr.), translated in G. BERMANN, H. DE VRIES, & N. GALSON, supra note 96.
134. Article 1151 of the French Civil Code provides:
Even in the case where nonperformance of the agreement is due to the fraud of
the obligor, the damages may include only that portion of the loss sustained by
the obligee and of the benefit of which he was deprived, which is the immedi-
ate and direct consequence of the nonperformance of the agreement.
Id. art. 1151.
135. G. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 150 (1988).
136. This view is suggested by the discussion of Earl Shipping Co. v. Afran Transp.,
SMA No. 1674B (1983). See Bulow, supra note 6, at 632. Where the breach is one of
several causes, see Schiro, supra note 41, at 1751 n.75. Schiro states that
one defense to the assumption of causation is that the defendant's act was but
one of several factors contributing to the loss and, therefore, that defendant
should not be liable. The generally accepted reply is that defendant is liable if
his action was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's loss, even if not the only
factor.
Id.
137. See Comment, supra note 50, at 997-1000. For cases where the courts have
based decisions on causation as a separate limitation on recovery, see Richardson v.
Crone, 127 Mont. 200, 202, 258 P.2d 970, 972 (1953) (referring to "supervening
cause") and Foss V. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Wash.2d 92, 99, 173 P.2d 144, 152 (1946)
(requiring "proximate cause"). For a more recent case where there was "foreseeability"
but no causation, see Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982).
In Overstreet, the buyer purchased Rhinomune to inoculate against a disease that caused
abortions in mares. Although the mares were inoculated, some aborted.
The fact that the abortions were foreseeable if the Rhinomune did not work
does not mean that the breach of warranty was the cause of the abortions.
There was simply a failure to prevent an occurrence that nothing would have
prevented, and [buyer] may not recover the value of the foals.
Id. at 1296.
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further, a recent British case differentiated between causation
and remoteness, stating that although "some of the relevant con-
siderations are the same, "they are "quite different concepts." 38
Usually, however, "foreseeable" connotes "causation"; if a U.S.
court finds that the damages were foreseeable, the court also
finds that the breach caused the loss. 139  Thus, to the extent that
a foreseeable loss means a loss not remote, 140 in England it does
not also mean causation will automatically be inferred. German
law also distinguishes causation from foreseeability.141
In the United States, remoteness and causation can overlap, as
illustrated by an old case involving an erroneous invoice.142 The
defendant sold bales of cloth to the plaintiff. The invoice errone-
ously showed more yards of goods than there actually were. The
goods were shipped into Mexico where the tariff was paid based
on the larger amount. When the error was discovered, the seller
reimbursed the buyer the amount of overpayment for the goods.
The Mexican customs office, however, would not refund the
overcharge on the tariff. In a suit by the buyer against the seller
to recover the amount of the extra tariff charge, the court held
that the seller was not liable for the extra tariff charged. The
damage was too "remote." The court noted that "[a]ll this
depends on the conduct of others, the mode of their dealing, the
practice of a custom-house, or the laws of a foreign country; per-
haps on the greater or less vigilance of the vendee or his
agents.' ' 143 It could also be argued that the "cause" of the loss
was not the incorrect invoice but the refusal of the Mexicans to
correct the error. Both points could be covered by saying that
the defendant was unable to foresee the loss.
(d). "At the time of the conclusion of the contract"
The "at the time" (for determining what is foreseeable-or for
having "reason to know") language in the C.I.S.G. is the same
time as that set out in the Hadley rule, the UCC in section 2-
138. A. CORBIN, supra note 59, § 1006 ("Our only test of causation... is foreseeabil-
ity."); see also NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 78, at 702 (same).
139. Stinnes Interoil GmbH v. A. Halcoussis & Co. (The Yanxilas No. 2), 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 676, 681-82 (1984).
140. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 153; see alsoJ. HONNOLD, supra note 9, at 411 n.7
(discussing the German concepts of "foreseeability").
142. Hargous v. Ablon & Boyd, 5 Hill 472 (N.Y.), aff'd, 3 Denio 406 (1843).
143. Id. at 475.
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715(2)(a), 14 4 and the Restatement in section 351(1).145 In a case
following Hadley, Gee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. ,146 an English
court suggested that the time rule be changed to allow for notice
after the contract was made. 147 This suggestion was not accepted
in later decisions,1 48 and one recent British writer referred to the
suggestion as "heresy." 149  Nonetheless, in his 1975 study of
Hadley, Danzig argued for a similar rule. 150 Danzig described the
rule of Hadley as "irrelevant to the modern age"' 15 ' and argued
that a rule allowing notice after the execution of the contract has
merit in some cases.'
52
Danzig based this argument on the thesis that there are societal
gains in certain breaches of contract, and applied the "efficient
breach" theory to recovery of consequential damages. This the-
ory, which debuted in 1970153 and was dubbed in 1977,154 has
been discussed extensively. 55 Professor Linzer provided a suc-
144. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1); see infra note 236.
146. Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 158 Eng. Rep. 87 (Ex. 1860).
147. Baron Bramwell suggested that the Hadley rule might be further qualified:
[t]hat in the course of the performance of the contract one party may give
notice to the other of any particular consequences which will result from the
breaking of the contract, and then have a right to say: "If, after that notice,
you persist in breaking the contract I shall claim the damages which will result
from the breach."
Id. at 90.
148. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903); Gerwin
v. Southeastern California Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 220,
92 Cal. Rptr. 111, 118 (1971) (stating that "foreseeability ... is to be determined as of
the time the contract was entered into and not as of the time of the breach"); see A.
CORBIN, supra note 59, § 1008 (stating that defendant must have reason to foresee the
injury at the time he or she enters into the contract); Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 1203.
149. Adams, supra note 86, at 148.
150. R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 98.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 103. "A more sophisticated rationale for the rule in this context might
focus on its effect on a seller not at the time of his entering a contract, but rather at the
time of his deciding whether to voluntarily breach or to risk breaching." Id.
153. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).
154. Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and The Just Compensation Prinicple:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554
(1977).
155. In addition to Birmingham, supra note 153, and Goetz & Scott, supra note 154,
see Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277
(1972); Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 351; Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980); Jackson, 'Anticipatory Repudiation' and the
Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Pro-
spective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978); Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract
Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Mac-
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cinct summary of efficient breach:
In the context of contracts, efficiency theory suggests that
promisors who breach increase society's welfare if their benefit
exceeds the losses of their promisees. Such failure to perform,
the so-called efficient breach of contract, is illustrated by the
following. Assume that Athos owns a woodworking factory
capable of taking on one more major project. He contracts to
supply Porthos with 100,000 chairs at $10 per chair, which will
bring Athos a net profit of $2 per chair, or $200,000 on the
contract. Before any work takes place, Aramis, who sells
tables, approaches Athos. Although there are several chair
factories in the area, only Athos's factory can make tables. If
Athos will supply Aramis with 50,000 tables, Aramis will pay
him $40 per table. Athos can produce the tables for $25, so he
can make a net profit of $750,000 if he uses his factory for
Aramis's tables. But to do so, he must breach his contract
with Porthos. There are other chair factories, and Porthos will
be able to get the chairs from one of them-for example, from
D'Artagnan's. Let us assume that because of his distress situa-
tion Porthos will have to pay D'Artagnan 20% more than
Athos's price for comparable chairs, and that Porthos will sus-
tain $100,000 in incidental administrative costs and conse-
quential costs such as damages for delay to his customers.
Even with these costs, Porthos will lose only $300,000 because
of Athos's breach, and Athos can reimburse him in full and
still make $450,000 profit, over twice the profit from his con-
tract with Porthos. 15 6
As an aside, this example does not describe a "garden variety"
sale of existing goods. Suppose that Aramis offered to buy the
(completed) chairs which Athos has agreed to sell Porthos. In
such a case, is Aramis willing to pay Athos a price higher than the
market price? If he does not pay a higher price, under the dam-
ages formula based on the difference between Porthos's contract
price and the market price, Athos will owe Porthos as much as he
gains from Aramis. Moreover, if the market has risen a great
deal, it would pay Aramis to deal with Porthos, who, because of
the great rise, could sell slightly below market price and still
make a profit. But then why would Porthos sell below market?
Clearly something more than market forces would be involved.
The reader may ask how often these unusual situations come
along. Whatever the answer, the "efficient breach" doctrine has
generated much discussion.
neil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); Marschall,
Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing RemediesiJr Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733
(1982); and Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE LJ. 271 (1979).
156. Linzer, supra note 155, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
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Under the rule that foreseeability is required at the time of the
making of the contract, Danzig pointed out that a person in
Athos' predicament has difficulty in making a sound decision on
the results of the breach. 157 A sounder decision can be made
nearer the time of performance or breach. The true loss to the
party who will be injured by a breach will be, on the average,
more apparent the closer in time to the intended breach one tries
to predict that loss. Fresher data will be available-a knowledge
of prices at a time closer to when performance would be due, for
example. Difficulty in predicting the loss does not encourage
breach. An intentional breach of a contract for the sale of goods,
however, will not necessarily produce a benefit to society. From
an economic standpoint, it must be argued that "it is difficult to
identify circumstances in which breach, rather than performance
will produce [more efficient use of resources]."
' 158
The argument favoring intentional breach is based on eco-
nomic considerations only. Since buyers and sellers enter com-
mercial contracts to make money, and the damages under
discussion here are monetary remedies, perhaps no other consid-
eration should be entertained. However, other considerations
do enter into one's views of a breach of contract. Parties enter
into contracts, for example, because they place great store in reli-
ability.159 Buyers may not want to continue doing business with a
seller who has been breaking promises whenever he thought it
economically more profitable. (A reaction "His word is his
bond-but for a buck!" is not a promising one.) Can injured par-
ties be sure that they will always be adequately repaid for their
loss? Will the injured party be content with what is offered with-
157. R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 104.
Resting the seller's liability on whether the type of damages incurred was "nor-
mal" (or, in the UCC's words, whether it was a type of damage of which the
seller had "reason to know"), seems undesirable because it lets an all-or-noth-
ing decision ride on an indicator about which many sellers cannot, at the time
of breach, speculate with confidence. Further, if recoverability of a type of
damages is established, a seller may often have no reasonable basis for deter-
mining the magnitude of the damages involved.
Id.
158. Schiro, supra note 41, at 1728; Farber, supra note 155 (pointing out the need to
focus on the effect of transaction costs and imperfect information).
159. Linzer, supra note 155, at 112.
In this Article, "morality" stands for the idea that it is both fair and appropriate
to hold people to promises that they freely made. This view is inspired both by
a desire to protect the promisee's reasonable expectations and by a sense that
personal liberty requires that people be able to bind themselves in a manner
that will be enforced by the courts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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out resorting to a lawsuit? To return to a thought expressed
above, the inadequate protection given by the present rules for
recovery of damages in breach of contract cases should be reason
enough for the law to discourage any breach.160 If the new deal
with Aramis is so appealing, what is wrong with Athos' working
out a mutual recission of the contract with Porthos?
In addition, there are other values to be considered. An "effi-
cient breach" runs counter to the concept of good faith. 161 Good
faith is expected in the performance of sales contracts under the
UCC.162 Good faith is also expected under the C.I.S.G. 163 In the
international sphere, McDougal and Bebr discuss the common
demands of people to share basic values.164 According to these
authors, while one of these basic values is "wealth," another is"rectitude."165 For some people around the world, pacta sunt ser-
vanda (agreements should be kept) refers to international con-
tracts as well as international treaties.
Half a century ago in the United States, McCormick illustrated
that when a breach was intentional, courts were more likely to
find the loss "foreseeable."166 In addition, recent decisions of
arbitral tribunals indicate that those tribunals treat intentional
160. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
161. This Article considers the notion of "efficient breach," concluding that it is
faulty and that such breaches should not be encouraged by the courts' use of remedial
principles that allow the willful breacher to profit from his breach. "Even if the theory
were realistic, the values that support it are of less importance to society than the princi-
ple of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts."
Marschall, supra note 155, at 734.
162. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987) provides "[e]very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
163. For the text of Article 7, see supra note 3.
164. McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603-08
(1964).
165. Id. Their thesis is that people demand "freedom to choose standards of rectitude
and responsibility, to explain life, the universe, and values, and to worship as may seem
best." The "base value" of rectitude includes ideas of right and wrong, arising out of
religion or not. Some people's belief that it is wrong to break a contract will be based on
reasons other than those monetary. Id.
166. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 574-75.
In determining whether to tighten or relax in a particular case the curb upon
damages in contract cases, which they exert through the flexible concepts of"notice" and "reasonable contemplation," it seems probable that two factors,
of which the rule itself takes no account, exert a deep influence: . . . Second,
the degree of fault attaching to the defendant. . . . Evidence that our courts
share the tendency to widen the liability of the deliberate contract breaker, as
distinguished from one who has by misfortune or mistake failed to carry out his
promise, is furnished by the instances where the courts in their opinions have
called attention to the willfulness of the defendant. In the view of the present
writer, this tendency is a wholesome one.
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breaches rather strictly.1 67
Limiting effective notice to the time of the contracting will not
always discourage breaches. For instance, a party may discover
at the time he or she decides to breach that losses will be much
greater than were "foreseeable" at the time of contracting. In
such a case, a rule which focuses on the time of contracting will
be less discouraging than one which focuses on the time of
breach. Nevertheless, if the notice time in the C.I.S.G., like the
rule in Hadley, discourages most intentional breaches, this author
would argue that this is a good result.
(e). "Facts and Matter of Which He Then Knew or Ought to
Have Known"
The expression in the UCC "had reason to know"' 68 does the
work of both the "facts .. .which he ... ought to have known"
and the "foresaw or ought to have foreseen" clauses in the
C.I.S.G. illustrating an interrelationship between the two. Inter-
preting the words of Article 74 may involve the consideration of
several sources of "knowledge" available to the breaching party
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. From one source,
the breaching party will have the knowledge that merchants in
general have-if this knowledge can be expected of this particu-
lar merchant. 69 From another source, the breaching party may
have the knowledge of possible consequences of a breach com-
municated by the other party to the contract. 70 This knowledge
167. Bulow, supra note 6, at 630 ("Depending on how outraged they become when
examining a breach, such Panels can now be persuaded to award to the innocent party
the savings and perhaps even the profits that the breaching party might otherwise have
gained from its non-performance.").
168. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1987). For the text of § 2-715(2)(a) see infra note 177.
169. Knapp, supra note 21, at 542.
The party in breach will be considered as knowing the facts and matters
enabling him to foresee the consequences of the breach of contract if such
knowledge generally flows from the experience of a merchant or, in other
words, if such knowledge can in the given case be expected of him having
regard to his experience as a merchant.
Id.
170. Id.
The party in breach will also be considered as having known the facts and mat-
ters enabling him to foresee the possible consequences of the breach, and
therefore, as having foreseen them, whenever the other party to the contract
has drawn his attention to such possible consequences in due time. Should a
party at the time of the conclusion of the contract consider that breach of con-
tract by the other party would cause exceptionally heavy losses or losses of an
unnatural nature, he may make this known to the other party with the result
that if such damages are actually suffered they may be recovered.
Id. Article 8 of the C.I.S.G. contains the rules for interpreting statements of the parties:
19891
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requirement presents the judge with no new problems. For in
the past, guided by Hadley and deciding what is "contemplable"
or "foreseeable," United States and British courts have accepted
the reality that "the usual course of things" changes. Carriers
today "contemplate" more than those in Baxendale's day. This
increase in knowledge may be caused by advances in technology
(carriers know more "things": air freight did not exist at the time
of Hadley, nor did land transport machines driven by gasoline
engines, nor did computers for transport of electronic informa-
tion),171 Modern business practices (and equipment), accounting
methods, and the extensive communication of information make
more knowledge available to both parties. This increased knowl-
edge may make potential amounts of loss easier to compute.1 72
A potential breacher today will have available a great deal more
information about what can happen concerning the contract and
hence "ought to know" a great many more facts than a potential
breacher in the nineteenth century.
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct
of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the party knew or
could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the
same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable per-
son would have had due consideration is to be given to all relevant circum-
stances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties
have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of
the parties.
C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 8.
171. In Dunn v. Bucknall Brothers, [1902] 2 K.B. 614, for instance, in changing the
rule for recovery for loss of a market on a voyage by sea, the court pointed out that since
the decision in the case establishing the rule to the contrary [The Parana, [1877] 2 P.D.
118], the means of sea transport had improved so that the accomplishment of voyages of
short duration was more certain. Hence different results should be foreseeable. In the
United States, in United States v. Middleton, 3 F.2d 384, 393 (4th Cir. 1924), the judge
pointed out that since steam had become a source of power, sea voyages could be calcu-
lated more certainly. Merchants made their calculations accordingly and shipowners
could be expected to utilize this increased information.
172. Vitex Mfg. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1967) (discussing the
inclusion of' overhead expenses in determining lost profits and citing previous cases
which had not allowed this inclusion). "Thus, where the contract is between business-
men familiar with commercial practices, as here, the breaching party should reasonably
foresee that his breach will not only cause a loss of clear profit, but also a loss in that the
profitability of other transactions will be reduced." Id.
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(f). "Consequences of breach"
(1). Consequential damages for the seller
The sections of the UCC concerning the measurement of
buyer's damages-for non-delivery or repudiation 173 and for
breach of warranty'74-also allow the damages provided for in
section 2-715, entitled "Buyer's Incidental and Consequential
Damages."' 75 While section 2-715 does not define incidental
173. U.C.C. § 2-713 provides:
Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market
price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation
by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental
and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of
rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
U.C.C. § 2-713 (1987).
174. U.C.C. § 2-714 provides:
Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods.
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification [§ 2-607(3)] he
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next
section may also be recovered.
175. Other sections of the U.C.C. also allow for a buyer's damages. U.C.C. § 2-711
provides:
Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyers Security Interest in Rejected Goods
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods
involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract
(Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may
in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all goods affected
whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this article (Section 2-
713).
U.C.C. § 2-712 provides:
"Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by mak-
ing in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between
the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or conse-
quential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him
from any other remedy.
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damages or consequential damages,176 it states what such dam-
ages include and lists some examples of those damages.1 77
Under the UCC, consequential damages include "any loss result-
ing from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know," and
(where there is breach of warranty) "injury to person" and
"injury to property."' 78 Article 5 of the C.I.S.G., which is more
restrictive than the UCC, provides that the C.I.S.G. does not"apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal
injury."' 79 Thus, the international buyer will have to look to
domestic law for recovery for death or personal injuries. Since
the C.I.S.G. does not expressly exclude damages or injury to
property, it may be open to question whether such coverage
exists in those countries which classify such claims for damages
as torts.' 80
In contrast to buyer's damages, sections 2-706, 2-708, and 2-
709 of the UCC, covering a seller's damages, provide that the
seller may recover incidental damages181 (examples of these are
176. For extensive treatment of these two categories of damages, see Anderson, Inci-
dental and Consequential Damages, 7J. L. & COM. 327 (1987).
177. U.C.C. § 2-715 provides:
Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses rea-
sonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715 (1987).
178. Id. § 2-715(2).
179. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 5.
180. Khoo, Product Liability, in C. BIANCA AND M. BONNELL, supra note 21, at 49-50.
181. U.C.C. § 2-706 in part provides:
Seller's Resale Including Contract for Resale.
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the
seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof.
Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable man-
ner the seller may recover the difference between the resale price and the con-
tract price together with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions
of the Article (Section 2-710) ....
U.C.C. § 2-708 in part provides:
Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect
to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-
acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market
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provided), 82 but make no provision for the seller to recover con-
sequential damages.'
83
In granting the right to recover consequential damages, Article
74 does not limit recovery to the buyer. What might consequent-
ial damages for the seller consist of? Of course, UCC Article 2,
in not providing for a seller's consequential damages (as distin-
guished from expressly excluding such damages), could not be
expected to answer that question. Under the C.I.S.G., however,
such damages could include recovery for the type of loss similar
to that for which the buyer currently recovers consequential dam-
ages. For instance, suppose the buyer expects to sell for a profit
the goods he contracts to purchase. If a breach occurs, the buyer
should try to avoid loss. 184 But when there is no delivery and the
buyer cannot avoid the consequences by covering with substitute
goods, the buyer would sue for profits lost. Similarly, suppose
the seller expects to do things with the money paid for the goods.
If the buyer fails to pay, the seller should try to avoid the loss.'
85
price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together
with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the mea-
sure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller
would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any inci-
dental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710) ....
U.C.C. § 2-709 in part provides:
Action for the Price.
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the next section ....
182. U.C.C. § 2-710 provides that "[i]ncidental damages to an aggrieved seller
include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's
breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the
breach."
183. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1987). Added to any argument that consequential damages
for the seller are excluded by implication is the provision in U.C.C. § 1-106(1) that
"neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically
provided in this Act or by other rule of law." Id.; Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki
Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1368 (7th Cir. 1985); Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion that these arguments are not
obviously correct, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMER, supra note 5, at 338-40.
184. Under Article 77 of the C.I.S.G., the injured party, whether the buyer or the
seller, should mitigate damages:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are rea-
sonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit,
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss
should have been mitigated.
C.I.S.G., supra note 1 art. 77.
185. Id.
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Still, the seller may suffer a loss when there is a failure of pay-
ment because the seller can not use the money as expected and
the seller can not avoid the consequences of that loss either by
selling the goods or borrowing. The seller should be able to
recover for that loss.186
If consequential damages are allowed, sellers' recoveries will
probably be different than either buyers' or borrowers' (in
breaches of contract to lend money). It should be easier, as a
rule, for a seller to borrow substitute money (which is theoreti-
cally always available for a price) than for a buyer to purchase
substitute goods (which are not always available); accordingly,
fewer claims should be expected by sellers for the expense of
obtaining the substitute (interest). Also, borrowers generally
specify the intended uses of loans. It follows from the notice of a
specific use to the lender that foreseeability is more probable in
the case of lenders than it is in the case of a buyer in a sale (who
is not told what the seller will do with the money).
(2). Incidental Damages
The UCC does not permit the seller to recover "consequen-
tial" as well as "incidental" damages. The Restatement permits
the seller to recover both. 87 But why are two different words
and two different categories of damages necessary? Are inciden-
tal damages not a consequence of the breach and are conse-
quential damages not an incident of the breach? Textwriters
treated a Louisiana case decided before Hadley as illustrating the
186. This situation raises a question concerning the necessity of a resale to prevent a
loss. Consider the case of a buyer's breach followed by the seller's resale of the goods to
another. Assume that the contract price was $100,000 and the resale price is $90,000.
The resale will not put the seller in the same position as performance of the contract. In
the correlative situation, the buyer (who failed to receive goods because of a breach) in
purchasing substitute goods will supposedly purchase the same amount of goods and
thus have the same quantity as if the contract had been performed. If the substitute
contract costs the buyer more and the buyer does not have this extra amount, presuma-
bly the buyer will borrow the difference. For the seller in the hypothetical to obtain the
additional $10,000, and avoid the consequential damages that the seller would other-
wise suffer, the seller with an inventory adequate to do so might make a contract to sell
an extra one-ninth of the total goods. Must the seller do so? The seller's coming forth
with more goods would be similar to the buyer coming forth with more money for the
substitute purchase. But surely a court would consider it an equally acceptable way of
avoiding the consequences of the loss if the seller borrowed $10,000, unless the cost of
the loan was significantly more than the total cost of selling the extra one-ninth of the
total goods.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (1979), provides for recovery
of damages measured by "any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss,
caused by the breach."
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interchangeability of these words. 8 8 Based on a provision of the
Louisiana Civil Code, the case used the term "incidental" to
mean "consequential" damages.' 8 9 The plaintiff sought to
recover for the value of his law practice, lost when he went to
work on a plantation of the defendant (his father-in-law) under a
contract which the plaintiff claimed his father-in-law had
breached. The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that under
the Louisiana Code, "[t]he damages which a party can recover on
a breach of a contract, are those which are incidental to and caused
by the breach; and may reasonably be supposed to have entered
into the contemplation of the parties at the time of the con-
tract."'190 Despite the plain language used by the court, two trea-
tises later interpreted this case as involving consequential
damages. 191
Perhaps the term "incidental"'' 92 was chosen and those dam-
ages distinguished from "consequential" damages because the
former do not have to be proved foreseeable to allow recovery.
The New York Law Revision Commission, when considering the
adoption of the UCC, concluded that section 2-710 (the seller's
incidental damages) indicated the source of the right to inciden-
188. Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404, 410 (1839) (citing Louisiana Civil Code of 1928
art. 161).
189. Id. For a similar use of "incidental," see Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72
(1863).
190. Williams v. Barton, 13 La. at 410 (emphasis added).
191. T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 67 (2d ed. 1852);J. SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
§ 45, at 135 (3d ed. 1903).
192. There does not seem to be a connection between the word "incidental" as used
here and as used by Professor Fuller in the "incidental reliance interest." In his article,
Fuller uses the term "incidental" reliance in referring to expenses in connection with
certain acts following from the contract. The acts are not necessary to perfect the plain-
tiff's rights on the contract. Fuller contrasts the word "incidental" with "essential,"
which refers to expenses that the plaintiff must incur to prepare and to perform the
contract. If the reliance is "essential," the damages will usually be "natural"; if it is
'incidental," notice may be required. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 74, at 87-88.
For example, the plaintiff enters into a contract to purchase a machine used to make
products. The plaintiff spends money building a foundation that will be needed to sup-
port the machine. Loss of this money resulting from a breach of contract would fall
within the "incidental reliance" category rather than the "essential reliance" category
because the plaintiff does not have to spend this money to perform the duty (perfecting
his or her rights) under the contract, since the only duty is to pay for the machine. The
plaintiff may seek to recover the costs of building the foundation if the seller of the
machine breaks the contract, so long as the plaintiff meets certain requirements. Here
"incidental" goes with the requirement of notice. Yet the NEW YORK REPORT, supra note
78, at 701, associates "incidental" damages as those not requiring notice.
For a case involving Fuller's "incidental reliance", see L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
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tal damages is the "first branch" of the rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale.193 This interpretation would mean that "incidental"
damages are those that "arise naturally" and are those damages
which the defendant would be bound to foresee. Such an inter-
pretation does not, however, completely distinguish "incidental"
from "consequential" damages since some of the "consequen-
tial" damages, like injury to person or property, are bound to be
foreseen (if they proximately result)1 94 and other damages also
"arise naturally." 95
Modern courts also have difficulty distinguishing incidental
and consequential damages. One example appeared in a case
involving unsuitable oil that damaged machinery in a sawmill.' 96
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed, as "incidental"
damages, the recovery of "costs incurred in the repair and
replacement of mechanical parts damaged by the oil's failure to
function properly."' 197 But these damages could also be listed as
property damages under the consequential damages classifica-
tion. 98 The result is that "[t]he line between incidental and con-
sequential damages is rather unclear."' 99  However, this
193. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 78, at 696. These damages could be implied
from N.Y. Personal Property Law § 145(2) which used the expression "loss directly and
naturally resulting." The Report states that "[t]he terms 'directly and naturally' presuma-
bly refer to the 'first branch' of the rule" and therefore need not satisfy the "contempla-
tion" test. Id.; see also Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that the common law rule (Hadley 2) requiring that the damages be in contemplation of
the parties does not apply to incidental as distinguished from consequential damages).
194. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1987).
195. These damages are included in the "general requirements" language of U.C.C.
§ 2-715(2). J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 446 n.21.
196. Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971).
197. Id. at 507.
198. White and Summers agree as to the "consequential damages" characterization
in such cases (but do not add the classification "property damages"). J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 44 n.15.
199. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1369 (7th Cir.
1985). Following this quote in the text of the opinion, the court suggested a test: if the
expense or loss could have been avoided by greater prudence on the victim's part, dam-
ages sought to repay the loss are consequential. The court concluded that interest that
the victim (seller) paid to finance cars from which scrap metal was derived should be
classified as incidental damages. Id.
Another suggestion is found in Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the distinction is made that
incidental damages are normally incurred when a buyer (or seller) repudiates
the contract or wrongfully rejects the goods, causing the other to incur ...
expenses .... [while] consequential damages . . . [usually arise] from losses
incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties,
which were a proximate result of the breach.
1989] International Sale of Goods
confusion should not be interpreted as an argument that under
the UCC a seller may successfully sue for consequential damages
by claiming that such damages are the same as incidental
damages.
Article 74 of the C.I.S.G., which is more comprehensive than
the related UCC sections, provides for damages for loss suffered
"as a consequence of the breach" for both the buyer and the
seller. These damages are labeled neither "consequential" nor
"incidental." 20 0 Nevertheless, what the UCC calls "incidental"
damages seems to be included within the scope of Article 74.
Under the Restatement, terminology is not controlling 20 1 and
this may be the accepted view of the drafters of Article 74. Noth-
ing in the Article indicates an intent to abolish those types of
damages which the UCC labels "incidental."
(g). "Such damages may not exceed"
(1). The "Harsh" Cases
While it is encouraging to see broader protection for the
injured party, limiting the liability of the breaching party also
may be desirable under some circumstances. 20 2 In considering
ways to limit the liability of the breaching party under Article 74,
200. It is not certain that there was an intent by the drafters of the UCC to make
these words in the UCC terms of art. But the words "incidental" and "consequential"
are more than casual adjectives applied to the damages in § 2-715, for the caption is
"Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages." U.C.C. § 2-715 (1987). U.C.C. § 1-
109 states that "[s]ection captions are parts of this Act."
There is no similar word such as "general" or "direct" describing the damages found
in the sections for the seller's damages for non-acceptance or repudiation or for the
buyer's damages for non-delivery and repudiation. Nor are such words used when refer-
ring a reader from one section to another. For instance, § 2-711(1) simply provides that
a buyer can "cover" and (referring to "general" damages) "have damages under the
next section." Similarly § 2-714(3) could have provided for the buyer to recover "any
damages under the next section" without adding more. But it contains the words "inci-
dental and consequential."
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment c (1979).
Items of loss other than loss in value of the other party's performance are often
characterized as incidental or consequential. Incidental losses include costs
incurred in a reasonable effort, whether successful or not, to avoid loss, as
where a party pays brokerage fees in arranging or attempting to arrange a sub-
stitute transaction .... Consequential losses include such items as injury to
person or property resulting from defective performance .... The terms used
to describe the type of loss are not, however, controlling, and the general prin-
ciple is that all losses, however described, are recoverable.
Id.
202. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 12.17, at 891-92.
Sometimes a court is confronted with a large damage claim that seems greatly
disproportionate to the modest consideration received by the party in breach.
It may not seem just to require the party in breach to pay for all the loss that
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observe that the article provides that "damages may not exceed
the loss. .. " and does not add "or be less than the amount
proved." 20 3 The chosen words of Article 74 allow for leniency
toward the breaching party in the "harsh" case.20 4 Leniency
under the C.I.S.G. is in accord with the principle stated by Pro-
fessor Fuller: "it is not always wise to make the defaulting prom-
isor pay for all the damage which follows as a consequence of his
breach." 20 5 Arguably, the most important factor in determining
whether the award would be "harsh," is the relationship between
the consequential damages sought and the amount paid to the
party in breach of the contract. Treitel contrasts Hadley and The
Heron II on this basis. 20 6 Unfortunately, cases following Hadley
do not always handle the matter well.
(A). The "Tacit Agreement" Rule
The development of the "tacit agreement" rule 20 7 provides an
example of poor handling of the "harsh case" problem. The
"tacit agreement" rule derives from British Columbia Saw-Mill Co.
v. Nettleship,208 a case involving loss of machinery during car-
riage.209 SirJames Shaw Willes, 210 the gentleman who previously
he has caused, even though it was foreseeable and has been proved with rea-
sonable certainty.
Id.
203. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 74.
204. Hopefully this leniency will not lead to an interpretation which would unduly
limit the injured party's possibility of recovery. Such an outlook was expressed about 60
years ago in an English article which said,
[b]efore Hadley's Case, it was said that 'where a party sustains a loss by reason of
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.'
Though at one time fully accepted, this has become one of those generous aspi-
rations which the law does well to put but sparingly into practice.
Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 48 LAw Q. REV. 90, 107 (1932) (empha-
sis added).
205. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 74, at 84.
206. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 178. In Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. 1854), the loss of profits was 20 times the amount the carrier received for hauling
the shaft. In The Heron II, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350, the loss of profits was less than half
the freight paid the carrier.
207. Those who have thought that this rule was a thing of the past were probably
surprised to see it revived by Judge Posner in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d
951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
208. British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, [1868] 3 L.R.-C.P. 499.
209. The defendants contracted to carry to Canada machinery to erect a sawmill.
Part of the machinery was lost on the way and the mill could not be built until substitute
pieces were sent from England. The plaintiff recovered only the cost of the substitute
pieces plus interest. Id.
210. For more on this gentleman, see R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 83, 97-98. Sir
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had been counsel for Mr. Baxendale in Hadley and had been ele-
vated to the bench, wrote the opinion in Nettleship. Perhaps Sir
James did not believe that the Hadley rule adequately protected
the breaching carrier, for he constructed another hurdle for the
injured party to surmount before recovery. Contemplation of
the damages was not enough. Recovery was further limited by
the court's assertion that "the mere fact of knowledge cannot
increase the liability [beyond actual damages]. The knowledge
must be brought home to the party sought to be charged under
such circumstances that he must know that the person he con-
tracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with
the special condition attached to it" 2 1'-that is, inquiry into the
subjective thoughts of the breaching party at the time of
contracting.
The "tacit agreement" rule was adopted in the United States in
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 2 12 an opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes. 2' 3 The case involved a contract for the sale of cot-
tonseed oil between a firm in Texas and a firm in Kentucky.
Holmes addressed the question of whether the allegations of spe-
cial damages in the pleadings justified a recovery of damages
over and above the difference between the contract price of the
oil and the market price at the time of the breach. 214 The Court
held that they did not. The Court based its finding on the "tacit
agreement" rule, stating: "[W]hat the plaintiff would have been
entitled to recover . . .depends on what liability the defendant
fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have
warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed,
James also later wrote an opinion in Horne v. Midland Ry., 7 L.R.-C.P. 583, 591 (1872),
using the "tacit agreement" rule again.
211. Nettleship, 3 L.R.-C.P. at 509.
212. Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
213. One commentator has said about Justice Holmes's opinion: "[His] Globe Refining
opinion started out after the mirage of 'perfect compensation, not a penny more,' and
came out with as harsh a result as could a commercial woodenhead." K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS 188 (1960).
214. The buyer sent railroad cars to carry the oil from the Texas mill to another
destination. When the seller breached the contract, the plaintiff brought suit in federal
court. Among the consequential damages sought were the costs of sending the cars. If
those damages could not be recovered, the federal court did not have jurisdiction. Globe
Refining, 190 U.S. at 540. In 1903, when the Globe Refining case was decided, the matter
in dispute had to exceed $2,000 to confer jurisdiction on the (federal) Circuit Court.
Judiciary Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988)).
It is possible to read into the case a struggle by a straw-grabbing plaintiff who gets out
of the state court and into federal court only to be met by a determined Holmes, who
sends him back.
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when the contract was made." 21 5 The "or" clause of this state-
ment should have adequately protected the plaintiff (injured
party) in his expectation, because the plaintiff's supposition as to
what the defendant assumed would need only to be "reason-
able." Despite this quote the Court gave added protection to the
defendant, agreeing that "he must know" that the plaintiff "rea-
sonably believes that he accepts" the responsibility for conse-
quential damages or as Willes said, "the contract with the special
condition." 2 16 The defendant's acceptance or rejection of
responsibility for consequential damages is tacit in that the
defendant does not have to tell the plaintiff whether or not the
defendant "knows" that the plaintiff "reasonably believes that he
[the defendant] accepts" the responsibility. The reader is never
told how a finder of fact determines that the defendant "knows"
that the plaintiff "reasonably believes" the defendant's accept-
ance. Nor is one told why, if the plaintiff's belief is "reasonable,"
the defendant is not bound to know what the belief is.
Assume that the Hadley rule reflects what actually happens dur-
ing contracting. Perhaps Willes and Holmes meant for the rule
to apply to special types of Hadley 2 situations (Once a case is a
Hadley 1, recovery should be automatic). Willes and Holmes
may have meant to classify any case to which they intended to
apply the "tacit agreement" rule as a Hadley 2 case-even if it
appeared to some people to be a Hadley 1. The type of Hadley 2
case called for would be either one in which contemplation was
to be based on knowledge obtained other than by express
notice,217 or one in which even if a notice had been given, that
notice could be cancelled out as "indefinite" or "inadequate."218
215. Globe Refining, 190 U.S. at 544.
216. See supra note 208.
217. Examples are two cases mentioned by Bauer:
Courts have found difficulty in the following types of cases: (1) where reason-
able men may differ on the question whether, at the time of making the con-
tract, there was an inherent general probability that damage of the type in
question would occur as a result of such breach by defendant; [and] (2) where
reasonable men may differ on the question whether the facts operated to give
defendant knowledge, at the time of making the contract, that there was a spe-
cial probability that damage of the type in question would occur as a result of
such a breach.
Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 702 (1932). If one prefers
the approach that there are three Hadley Rules, one would classify this "contemplation"
as being governed by the "second rule." See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
218. For example, the Hadley Court said that although the carrier had been told the
intended use of the shaft and that the mill was shut down, the carrier had not been given
the further information that another shaft was not available. Thus, notice was not suffi-
cient. Commenting on this technique, Dean McCormick said:
[Vol. 23
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Once the facts had been interpreted to show such a situation,
contemplation would be based on "experience" (or "common
sense" or some similar bases that would avoid testimony as to
what the business community considered contemplable under
the circumstances). It would be necessary to avoid outside evi-
dence as to what the defendant ought to have contemplated. The
judge could then determine what was contemplated. The result
would be reached not because the defendant tacitly rejected the
obligation, but because the defendant did not consider the risk
and, therefore, could not tacitly assume the risk. If that is the
desired result, however, would it not be just as easy to say that
the risk was "not in the contemplation of the defendant" and
base the decision on Hadley without the added rule?
In any event, if the risk in fact was contemplated by the defend-
ant, what about the case in which the plaintiff reasonably thought
that the defendant, by saying nothing about the risk (in the
defendant's "tacit" non-acceptance), had accepted the liability?
Should the defendant be relieved of liability because of no
acceptance? Surely Holmes did not approve this situation.
There is no place in contract law for secret renunciations of
duties that objectively appear to have been assumed, 21 9 nor was
there such a rule at the time Mr. Justice Holmes was on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 220 In such a case, the
defendant should express reservations.
Assume that Hadley does not reflect what happens during con-
tracting. Consider it a fiction, just a rule serving to control juries
Usually the deficiency thus . . . found in the establishment of the element of
notice, in cases where the defendant concededly had ample knowledge of the
special purpose of the contract, is the failure to show that the defendant had
knowledge that the plaintiff could not attain this purpose and avoid the special
loss, by securing the same service which the defendant has promised from
other sources.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 573.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1979). This conclusion is in
accord with the statement on misunderstanding found in Restatement § 20:
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the
meaning attached to them by one of the parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party.
Id.
220. Concerning why a defendant was liable to pay for insurance premiums: "[I]f
the jury found that . . . the plaintiff believed, and had reason to believe, that he [the
defendant] did assent to it, his [the defendant's] secret intention not to do so was imma-
terial." Bohn Mfg. Co v. Sawyer, 48 N.E. 620, 621, 169 Mass. 477, 477 (1897). The
opinion was written by another justice, but Holmes did not dissent or concur in a sepa-
rate opinion so as to show a different view.
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who otherwise might award too much money.2 21 Taken as a
mental exercise, one must begin with a concept-whether a fact
was contemplable (or later "foreseeable") and in some cases per-
haps actually contemplated ("foreseen"). Then, to that concept,
one must overlay the possible-though-not-objectively-manifested
workings of a defendant's mind in assenting or not. One works
with a double fiction,222 which surely is a waste of time.
Controlling a jury in such a case may seldom be a problem
today. At the time Hadley was decided, juries were not always
used in civil cases, 223 and juries are used even less today. Juries
are not expected to play a significant role in cases for breach of
international contracts for sales. So the rule (or rules) of the case
which has served to restrain juries, now serves as a statement in
the opinion by judges giving reasons for the results. 224 If the
judge is acting alone, that judge should not need the added test.
The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale has as its goal that the damages
awarded will be fair and just.2 25 A judge who thinks that the
damages claimed do not fit this criterion can justify a ruling with
the single tool, "not in the contemplation of the parties" or "not
foreseeable", as most of the judges do now.
This needless rule was eventually rejected in England 226
(though some argued that this was only a recent rejection);227
221. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 565, 574; R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 94-95.
222. In both the Nettleship and Home cases, insufficiency of the carrier's knowledge
could have been the basis for the result using the Hadley rule without more. The new
rule added the fiction of a tacit promise to the original fiction of "contemplation." As
Williston put it, "The fiction here criticized is a manifestation of the broader fiction that
the parties contract for whatever obligations or consequences the law may impose upon
them." 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1357 (1957).
223. R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 95.
224. In The Heron II, [ 1969] 1 App. Cas. 350, 414, Lord Pearce colorfully put it that
"the lucubrations of judges who have to give reasons superseded the reticence of
juries."
225. What is fair and just depends on one's approach, of course. Compare the prin-
ciple as stated by Fuller & Perdue, supra note 74 and accompanying text, with that of
Judge Posner: "[T]he animating principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, . . . is that the costs of
the untoward consequence of a course of dealing should be borne by that party who was
able to avert the consequence at least cost failed to do so." Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
226. A. GUEST, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 564 (25th ed. 1979); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 70, at 576-77; Smith, supra note 29, at 285.
227. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 434 (1979). "[T]he
British Columbia Saw Mill case and the Home case represented the high-water mark of the
bargain approach which placed such severe limits on the damages recoverable . . . The
culmination of this process was not reached until recent years; indeed, it was only with
the decision of the House of Lords in Czarnikow v. Koufos Ltd. (The Heron II), in 1969 that
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and though adopted by the United States after that,228 the rule
was also rejected by most, 2 2 9 but unfortunately not all,230 U.S.
jurisdictions. Evra Corporation v. Swiss Bank Corporation23 1 was a
suit for negligent handling of a transfer of funds by telex to pay
for the charter of a ship. As a result, to get the use of a substitute
ship, the plaintiff had to pay the double rate provided for in its
original contract. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit denied recovery for losses sustained thereby.
This was only a few years after England in The Heron H disap-
proved "foreseeable" because it applied to tort damages, which
were easier to recover than those under the Hadley rule. Evra, on
the other hand, relying on Hadley and Globe, added to the diffi-
culty of recovering damages for a tort.
One might ask why the concern since Evra involved the rendi-
tion of services and not the sale of goods. In fact, Evra was con-
sidered a tort case and not a breach of contract case since the
plaintiff had no contractual relationship with the defendant. The
answer is that it is disturbing to see Globe being used again to
back up denial of recovery. The case is like the vampire from the
1930s "sequel" movies. One may think it dead, but it continues
to reappear to drain the lifeblood from what might have been a
good case for recovery, and its sole purpose on earth has been to
see that the injured party cannot recover. 23 2 Standing alone, it
hides the reason behind a fiction and gives little guidance for
it was reached, and that (in effect) these two leading nineteenth-century cases were dis-
carded." Id.
228. Interestingly, in Globe Refining, Holmes mentions Bramwell's suggestion in Gee
v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 158 Eng. Rep. 87, 91 (Ex. 1860), that perhaps notice
between the time of contracting and breach would be enough and adds that it "is not
accepted by the later decisions." Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540,
544 (1903). But when Holmes cites Willes's "tacit agreement" rule used in the Nettleship
case, the Justice does not point out that it is not accepted in later decisions and was not
the law in England at the time of the Globe decision. Globe is a 1903 case, later than
Smith's 1900 article, supra note 29, pointing out the rejection.
229. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 579 (noting the rejection of the doctrine in
most state jurisdictions); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 805 (1973); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, at 445; see also U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2 (1987) (stating that "[tihe 'tacit
agreement' test for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 comment a (1979) (rejecting the "tacit agreement" rule).
230. Morrow v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 261 Ark. 568, 550 S.W.2d 429
(1977). In Pennsylvania, the "tacit agreement" rule had even been applied to a sale of
goods contract in Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376
(1963). A later Pennsylvania court, however, declined to follow Keystone. R.I. Lampus
Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 474 Pa. 199, 378 A.2d 288 (1977).
231. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1017 (1982).
232. Referring to Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903),
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future cases. Such a convoluted rule is particularly inappropriate
for an international sales case. A simpler approach is more likely
to be uniformly (or harmoniously) followed in courts of different
legal systems.
(B). The "Foreseeable" Rule
Having rejected the tacit agreement rule, courts now have a
practice of limiting recovery in the "harsh" case solely by saying
that the damages were not "foreseeable." This practice changes
the meaning of "foreseeable" so that losses are "unforeseeable"
not as a matter of fact, but as a matter of fact and law. While this
practice is less involved than the tacit agreement rule was, the
real reason for the damages not being "foreseeable" should be
stated. 233 The technique need not be resorted to under the
C.I.S.G. since the wording of Article 74 permits a court to limit
recovery even though the damages in some cases are
foreseeable.234
Article 74 provides no guidelines for such cases, and this prob-
lem will not be one of the easier ones for a court. Once a court
determines that Article 74 does not guarantee that damages may
be recovered in the amount proved, only that this amount is the
upper limit, the court then may be compelled to state why it
reaches the result that it does. The court must find a basis for the
statement that the amount allowed to be recovered is less than
Dean McCormick said, "[tihe opinion seems almost perverse in its anxiety to make all
intendments against the pleader." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 579.
233. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 892-93.
[T]he tacit agreement test has now generally been discarded and no longer
affords a vehicle for limiting recovery in such cases.
Nevertheless, there remains a judical reluctance to impose on a contracting
party liability in an amount greatly disproportionate to the consideration that
he received .... Courts have covertly expressed their reluctance by so applying
the test of foreseeability as to find that what was foreseeable becomes "unfore-
seeable." They have also shown their reluctance by a particularly rigorous
application of the requirement of certainty. Use of the requirements of fore-
seeability and certainty as surrogates for some other principle, however, has
not contributed to clarity in dealing with this problem. What is the principle
for which these limitations are surrogates?
Id.
234. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 74. Professor Farnsworth earlier made a case for
a solution such as this:
A more satisfactory solution would be to preserve the test of foreseeability as
the outer limit of liability in contract, but to recognize a judicial prerogative to
further reduce that liability in light of a convincing showing that although the
consequences were foreseen, or at least foreseeable, the risk was not assumed
by the promisor.
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1209 (1970).
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the amount foreseeable. One possible solution is for the court to
indicate that the award is an amount that the court thinks is more
nearly proportionate to the payment which the breaching party
received. The advantage of this technique is that it provides a
simple rule and one that can be used to reflect legal and cultural
values in the United States and those of people in other legal
systems. The disadvantage of this solution is that if a court does
not examine the results of cases or writings in treatises from
other systems, the court will not be certain that the decision does
reflect the values of others. Due to the simple statement of the
rule in Article 74, development will have to come through judge-
made law and all judges may not weigh the proportion of pay-
ment to liability in a similar manner. A court handling such cases
will want to observe decisions of both local and foreign courts so
that there may be harmonization of results.
(C). The Restatement
While it is strongly discouraged, 235 some U.S. judges may be
tempted to seek "general" principles in U.S. contract law by
turning to the Restatement, since it contains a section limiting
consequential damages.
Perhaps because of dissatisfaction with the way in which the
"harsh" cases were disposed, some authorities in the field of con-
tracts sought a more equitable solution. The Restatement sec-
tion 351236 limits the recovery of consequential damages to those
235. Eorsi, General Provisions, in N. GALSTON AND H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
§ 2.04, at 2-12 (1984).
But the real danger to unification is that in the search for general principles it is
unlikely that the tribunals and parties would find the same "general principles."
And if different jurisdictions find different general principles or interpret them
in a different way, possibly following local practice, then unification will suffer a
heavy blow.
Id.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979) provides:
Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages.
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was
made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows
from the breach
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of
events, that the party in breach had reason to know.
(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for
loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or other-
wise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to
avoid disproportionate compensation.
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that the party in breach had reason to foresee at the time that the
contract was made. But subsection (3) is new, 2 3 7 presently a
novel idea, which allows the court to limit damages "for foresee-
able loss" if it concludes "that in the circumstances justice so
requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation." 238
The subsection refers specifically to excluding loss of profits and
to limiting recovery to reliance losses. But the subsection also
covers a wider area with "or otherwise." This varies from the
Hadley rule and it has been suggested that the limitation may have
been a reaction to "excessive recoveries that occurred in an
expanding, inflationary economy." 239  This limitation goes
beyond case law.240
One situation which could be covered by the "or otherwise"
reference in the new subsection is where the buyer is in a supe-
rior economic position and can bear the financial risk better than
the seller. Such a position has been described by Professor Stone
in both an article and a legislative proposal concerning the liabil-
ity for consequential damages of a supplier of a component part
of an automobile when the automobile is recalled.24 t Stone lists
Recovery of consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2- 7 15(2)(a) is limited to those"which could not reasonably be prevented by coyer or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a)
(1987). For the full text of § 2-715 see supra note 177. Unlike RESTATEMENT § 351,
§ 350(1) provides for avoidability as a limitation on damages.
Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss
that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation.
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in Sub-
section (1) to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to
avoid loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1979). Article 77 of the C.I.S.G. simi-
larly limits recovery. It provides:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are rea-
sonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit,
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach
may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should
have been mitigated.
C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 77. For the importance of this when a party relies on Article
74, seeJ. HONNOLD, supra note 9, at 418.
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979). For thoughtful dis-
cussions of this new subsection, see Harvey, Discretionary Justice Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1982); Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 19, 24-30 (1981).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979). See Farnsworth, supra
note 234.
239. H. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, BREACH AND REMEDIES 7 .03[3][e], at
7-17 (1986).
240. Id.
241. Stone, Recovery of Consequential Damages for Product Recall Expenditures, 1980 B.Y.U.
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several factors which, in addition to foreseeability, a court will
consider as relevant in allocating the loss and makes a good case
for relieving to the supplier from damages which the supplier
had reason to foresee.
242
This approach is more open about the reasons for limiting the
damages than either the "tacit agreement" rule or the "unfore-
seeable" test. 243 A statement that the recovery is unjust is a more
accurate reflection of the thoughts of the judge than one that
dwells in the never-never land of contracting parties who make a
collateral contract ("I accept the responsibility") to ride piggy
back on another collateral contract ("You will be liable for conse-
quential damages as well as direct") which in turn is tacked on to
the actual contract of the parties. Still, the Restatement subsec-
tion itself is admittedly a novelty and not reflected in existing law.
(2). The "In-Between" Cases
Some courts have read the Hadley rule to require an all-or-
nothing recovery (usually meaning nothing for the injured party)
and have rightly been criticized for not permitting other pos-
sibilities (unless no loss was foreseeable).
244 Nevertheless, both
the wording of Article 74 and the results of cases following Had-
ley show that this need not be the result. The basis for not
L. REV. 485; Stone, Allocation of Risk for Product Recall Expenditures: A 
Legislative Proposal,
1975 DET. C.L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Allocation of Risk].
242. Allocation of Risk, supra note 241, at 5-6. The factors are:
(a) Is the seller compensated for the risk?
(b) Is there a gross disparity between the compensation received 
by the seller
and the damages sought by the buyer?
(c) Was the breach by seller willful?
(d) Factors with reference to interpretation and construction 
of seller's and
buyer's contract for allocation of risk: (i) Did seller and buyer 
agree to extend
liability to include the damages in question, or to limit or preclude 
liability for
the damages in question? (ii) Are the seller and buyer in a relatively 
equal
bargaining position, or is there a great disparity? (iii) Is the 
agreement
between seller and buyer so one-sided that the court will not 
enforce their
agreement? (iv) Was the agreement bargained out or was the agreement 
essen-
tially a form contract with considerable "boiler-plate" language 
contained
therein? (v) Which party chose the language of the agreement?
(e) Where may the risk most economically be borne?
Id.
243. Yet there is a hint that RESTATEMENT § 351(3) is the "tacit 
agreement" rule in
sheep's clothing. In fact, § 351(3) might well have been written 
as follows without much
change of intent:
On occasion, consequential damages will seem disproportionate to 
the values
apparently involved in the agreed exchange. When that is so the 
injured party
may recover such damages only to the extent that the liability 
was within the
tacit agreement of the parties.
Young, supra note 237, at 30.
244. Comment, supra note 50, at 1020.
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allowing some in-between recovery must turn on what was fore-
seen by (or was within the contemplation of) the defendant,
rather than on what was foreseeable objectively. It is highly
unlikely that an in-between amount of loss was ever contem-
plated by either party.245 The plaintiff may claim that he foresaw
the amount that he asks for; the defendant may claim to have
foreseen no loss. If, however, one takes the standard to be objec-
tive, there are other possibilities. For instance, the court may
consider what the parties should have foreseen, even if the loss
was not actually foreseeable by either (because of failure to get
proper data).246 The court can find as "foreseeable" a non-
existing result-the amount plaintiff would earn under a normal
contract, when in fact the plaintiff did not make a normal con-
tract. This latter approach can be used not only when the party
in breach faces a "harsh" result, but also when the result, though
not "harsh," would be unfair because there was inadequate
notice of a special purpose.
Shortly after Hadley, the courts began to acknowledge that the
plaintiff should recover something, even while denying the
amount claimed by the plaintiff because "not within the contem-
plation of" the parties. One example is Home v. Midland Railway
Company, 24 7 one of Sir James Willes's cases. 248 Home involved a
contract to supply military shoes at an unusually high price, a
price unknown to the defendant. After the defendant breached,
the goods were resold at a loss. The plaintiff was not awarded
damages commensurate with the profit he would have made had
the defendant not breached. The court reasoned that the profit
was based on a price that the defendant did not know because the
price was unusually high and therefore not contemplated by the
breaching party. But even Sir James, the man who had success-
fully argued for limiting Baxendale's loss and who fashioned the
"tacit agreement" rule,249 awarded the plaintiff what would have
been a "normal" profit. In that case, since the resale contract
245. On the "thinking" aspect of this, see Gow, A Comment on the Rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 27 AuSTL. L.J. 666 (1954) (considering how knowledge fits into the concept of
foreseeability).
246. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 565. "This standard is in the main an objec-
tive one. It takes account of what the defendant who made the contract might then have
foreseen as a reasonable man, in the light of the facts known to him, and does not con-
fine the inquiry to what he actually did foresee." Id. (footnote omitted).
247. Horne v. Midland Ry., 7 L.R.-C.P. 583 (1872).
248. For the importance of SirJames Willes, see R. DANZIG, supra note 5, at 83, 97-
100.
249. British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, [1868] 3 L.R.-C.P. 499.
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was not in fact made, normal profit meant damages based on the
difference between the market price and a supposed resale price.
In Cory v. Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Company,250 the
plaintiff bought a derrick from the defendant with the intention
of using it to transship coal from colliers to barges without the
necessity of intermediate landing. The most obvious intent was
to use the hull as a coal store, while the use for transshipment
was novel and unknown to the defendant. When the defendant
breached, the value of the loss of the derrick hull as a coal store
alone would have been £450. The loss measured by use to trans-
ship would have been much more. The defendant argued that
not only should the larger sum be denied, but the £450 should be
denied as well. The court awarded the lesser amount; Mr. Justice
Blackburn considered that this award was necessary in order to
follow the rule of Hadley, even though the amount was based on
non-existent facts. 251 Still other cases illustrate that in-between
recoveries were considered early on.
252
A later case is Victoria Laundry253 in which a seller who delayed
delivery of machinery was liable for the normal profits lost
(though they would not have been made by performance), not
the unforeseeable exceptional profits (though they probably
would have been made).
254
Since Article 74 provides that the damages "may not exceed"
rather than "must equal" the foreseeable loss, it is conceivable
that even more imaginative awards will be fashioned. 255 A busi-
ness person who has lost a profit should not be content with an
award of only interest on the investment. The business person
took a risk-an award of damage based on the difference between
250. Cory v. Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Co., [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 181.
251. Id. at 188.
252. Elbinger Actien-Gesellschaft fur Fabrication von Eisenbahn Material v. Arm-
strong, 9 L.R.-Q.B. 473 (1874); Hammond v. Bussey, 20 Q.B.D. 79, 88 (1887).
253. Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus., [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (C.A.).
254. Id.
255. In an appropriate case it is conceivable that a court might even tailor recovery
so as to split the risk between the two parties and meet the objection of one commenta-
tor that the traditional rule "usually permits only all-or-nothing recovery." Farnsworth,
supra note 60, at 1209 (quoting Comment, supra note 50, at 1020); see generally Bulow,
supra note 6, at 629 (analyzing the "tailoring" of recovery in Earl Shipping Co. v. Afran
Transport, SMA No. 1674 (1983)). Any conclusion about fashioned awards must be
made with reservations. See Young, supra note 237, at 22, "In general courts are resis-
tant to half-measure solutions that are either notably crude or notably refined. They are
more receptive to the idea that some component of a loss claim (such as lost profit) be
excised and the remainder granted." Id. Yet Professor Young later cites cases of courts
granting "relief by half-measure." Id. at 29-30 nn.55-5
8 .
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interest on money and the profit made by taking the risk is the
worth of the risk.
VIII. THE VIEWS OF OTHERS
Harmonization of results in cases under the C.I.S.G. will
require the courts of each country to observe the decisions of
courts of other nations. But early on, before the cases begin to
be reported, some knowledge of the views found in civil law
countries should be helpful to U.S. judges. What generalizations
about the civil law, pertinent to the clauses of Article 74, may be
reached?
In civil law systems, contract is part of the general law of obli-
gations, which also includes tort. Generally speaking, just as
fault is required in tort, fault also is required in order to recover
certain contractual remedies in breach of contract, with some
exceptions.256 However, neither German nor French law
requires fault in order to hold the seller of generic goods liable
for failure to deliver.257 This civil law concept is in accord with
the C.I.S.G. and the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods (USIL), neither of which requires
fault to recover for failure to deliver or breach of warranty. 258
Article 74 merely requires that the loss be foreseeable by the
party in breach. Under French law, as under that clause and the
common law, the question is what loss was foreseeable by the
"party in breach" rather than the loss that was foreseeable by
both parties. 259
Another clause of Article 74 uses the time of contracting as the
point from which foreseeability is judged.2 60 French law also
uses that time.261 In connection with the time of breach, there
was a discussion of intentional breaches. The encouragement of
intentional breaches should find little comfort on the continent.
Depending on the circumstances, an intentional breach under
the C.I.S.G. could amount to bad faith; good faith is expected
under both the UCC and the C.I.S.G. . The concept of good
faith in German law, expressed as treu und glauben, is even more
influential than in the United States. There is, for example, a
256. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 8.
257. Id. at 15, 16.
258. Id. at 23.
259. Id. at 160.
260. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 74; U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1987); supra note 93.
261. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 161.
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legal duty even to negotiate a contract in good faith. 262
In the area of consequential damages, the national law of
France (as distinguished from French law under the C.I.S.G.)
provides that although the party in breach generally is liable only
for the damages that the party foresaw or should have foreseen,
the limitation does not apply where the breach is due to the
party's "fraud"-meaning an intentional breach. 263 Although in
such cases where there has been an intentional breach and the
party's liability is not limited to foreseeable damages, the
breacher nonetheless is not liable for "indirect" damages.
2 64
This differentiation between "foreseeable" and "direct" dam-
ages may cause a U.S. judge some confusion since foreseeability
is the test for both remoteness and causation in the United
States.265 To explain the French view, consider the example of
one who sells a diseased cow and conceals the fact. 266 The seller
is liable for both the loss of the cow and for other animals which
contracted the disease, whether their loss was foreseeable or not.
If, however, the loss of the other animals makes it impossible to
cultivate land, the party in breach is not liable for this loss,
because the loss to the land is considered indirect. Furthermore,
if the inability to cultivate the land renders the victim unable to
pay debts and creditors levy on the lands, the party in breach is
not liable for this loss either. These losses are "indirect".
267
Finally, with respect to "in-between" recoveries, (meaning that
recovery may be allowed even though a special loss was not fore-
seen), the French view also supports the idea of awarding dam-
ages "to the extent of the loss," avoiding an all-or-nothing rule.
For instance, the French requirement of foreseeability resulted in
a rule that a carrier was liable for the "normal" value of parcels
lost, even if that amount did not approximate the actual value of
the parcel. 268
262. See Kessler and Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964).
263. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 146. "What is meant by 'fraud' in this context is
a deliberate breach of contract or one committed in bad faith ... It seems that in French
law . . . a deliberate breach (faute intentionnelle) is sufficient, even in the absence of a bad
motive." Id.
264. Id. at 150.
265. Supra note 130 and accompanying text.
266. G. TREITEL, supra note 135, at 167.
267. Insofar as measuring the amount of damages is concerned, the German law
does not recognize fault as a reason to alter the measure. Swiss and Australian law,
however, do. Id. at 146.
268. Id. at 154; see also id. at 155 (comparing the result of Victoria Laundry).
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CONCLUSION
The United Nations Convention for the International Sale of
Goods will provide a new experience for judges in interpretation.
The law, as set down in the C.I.S.G. articles, represents a com-
promise among several countries and several legal systems. One
of the goals of the C.I.S.G. is that the results of the cases decided
under the C.I.S.G. will be harmonized. For U.S. judges, this har-
monization means trying to reach results similar to those of
judges from systems that do not recognize the doctrine of prece-
dent and hence do not put the same emphasis on cases as does
the common law system. This article has looked to that part of
the C.I.S.G. concerned with consequential damages to consider
what U.S. courts may do in interpreting the words contained
there.
United States judges may be guided by past experience in this
area, experience influenced somewhat by the British case of Had-
ley v. Baxendale. However, the law in the C.I.S.G. is definitely dif-
ferent from the rules of that case. The principle of the case-that
there should be some limitation on the recovery of damages-is
still a valid one. But the C.I.S.G. article does not reflect the so-
called Hadley rules. The C.I.S.G. article also differs from the law
of the UCC. These differences may lead to a variety of results.
For example, the actual loss suffered by the party injured by a
breach is more likely to be recovered, since it only need be fore-
seeable as a possible result. For another example, a seller suffer-
ing a loss classified as consequential damages, generally not
recoverable inder the UCC, would be able to recover for that loss
under the C.I.S.G. article. For still another example, the flexibil-
ity allowed for awards should give judges an opportunity to state
more frankly the reasons for awarding the amounts that they
decide on in harsh cases. Next, there is an opportunity to grant
"in-between" awards, even in cases which are not harsh, when
the judge thinks that the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable
amount that is less than the amount he is seeking. Finally,
although is does not represent a departure from present law, the
C.I.S.G. should discourage intentional breaches of contract.
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